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Introduction 
“Call it empathy, call it prejudice, but whatever it is, it is not law. 
 In truth, it is more akin to politics. And politics has no place in the courtroom.” 
- US Senator Jeff Sessions
1
 
In the summer of 2009, political elites of the United States of America were deciding 
about an empty seat at the US Supreme Court. President Barack Obama nominated 
Judge Sonia Sotomayor
2
 as a suitable candidate. This nomination aroused a vivid public 
debate, not only because of Judge Sotomayor’s Puerto Rican background but mostly 
because of her previous political public statements in favour of Hispanic women.
3
 She 
was even labelled as a racist, although many later withdrew this accusation.
4
 Judge 
Sotomayor’s nomination was discussed by the Senators for several days before she was 
finally appointed to the US Supreme Court. The Senators’ deliberations were intensely 
discussed by the media which gave the general public the opportunity to witness and 
comment on the whole process.
5
 The political flavour of the appointment was thus 
balanced by the vivid public debate on the issue. 
But American politics is not what this thesis is going to be about.  
In the spring of 2010, there were three positions at the CJEU to which new judges were 
to be appointed; one at the ECJ and two at the EGC.
6
 This was the first chance to test 
the new ‘Article 255 Panel’, a body created “to give an opinion on candidates’ 
suitability.”
7
 In the case of the ECJ everything went smoothly and Ms Alexandra 
Prechal was appointed as the Dutch judge after receiving a ‘favourable opinion’ from 
                                                          
 
1
 See (Phillips, 2009). 
2
 For a short biography, see: http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx. 
3
 See for example (Sotomayor, 2001). 
4
 See (Davis, 2009). 
5
 See for example: (Phillips, 2009), including the discussion under the post. 
6
 According to Article 19 of the TEU, the full judicial institution of the European Union is called the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and it is composed of the Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
General Court (EGC) and special courts, which today only includes the Civil Service Tribunal (CST). 
This thesis focuses mostly on the ECJ. However, when referring to the full judicial institution, the 
abbreviation CJEU is used. For the functioning of the CJEU, see for example (Barents, 2010). 
7
 See Article 255 TFEU. 
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the Panel.
8
 A few months later, however, the Panel was less generous in their opinions. 
Upon the expiry of term of fourteen EGC judges, the Panel was in session again, 
assessing fourteen candidates. We do not know much about the candidates’ profiles, nor 
can we see into the Panel’s deliberations. The only thing we know from the published 
Council documents is that after the Panel "[had] given an opinion on the suitability of 
the […] judges,"
9
 two names were mysteriously dropped from the list of the candidates: 
Judge Czúcz (the Hungarian candidate standing for reappointment) and Mr Christos 
Vassilopoulos (the new Greek candidate).
10
 No formal decision, no reasoning, and no 
public debate to testify to their reasoning.
11
 
The contrast is obvious: in the US, the discussion about the judges’ appointment is 
available to the public, the arguments are available to citizens and an on-going public 
debate is self-evident. In the EU the appointment happens in camera, the documents are 
either cryptic or non-existent and citizens are only faced with the final decision. By 
doing so, the EU is essentially making a unilateral decision to for citizens with no 
transparency or reasoning, in essence telling its citizens: ‘take it or leave it.’ 
When reading a case from the US Supreme Court, one always knows who wrote the 
judgment; you can often even hear the judge’s voice in the reasoning. And then, moving 
on to the concurring and dissenting opinions, you can look into the contrasting views of 
other Justices. Why is this so? The Justices of the US Supreme Court are celebrities, 
their personalities and preferences are well-known, law students often have their 
favourite Supreme Court Justice.
12
 In the EU, an average law student would hardly be 
able to name one or two of the twenty-seven ECJ judges. The case-law of the ECJ is a 
product of ‘teamwork’: the individual judges do not sign the judgments, dissenting or 
concurring opinions do not exist, and judicial deliberations are perfectly secret. 
                                                          
 
8
 See Decision 9720/10 (2010). 
9
 See Decision 9720/10 (2010). 
10
 See (EU Law Blog, 2010), see also (Bobek, 2010). 
11
 The CJEU has even “categorically rejected any duplication of the “American” model of congressional 
scrutiny of candidates for nomination at the Supreme Court.” See (Barents, 2010), p. 713. 
12
 The US Supreme Court established its own authority early in its history (Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 
137 [1803]) and has made crucial decisions that should have gone through the legislature but did not 
(Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [1954], Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 [1973], United States v 
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 [1995], etc.). Transparency in the judicial system (and the federal 
government in general) is seen as a way of ameliorating the tension between various competing opinions. 
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In both the US and in the EU, the judiciary is often accused of being political. This 
thesis does not attempt to compare and contrast the two grand judiciaries; they are too 
dissimilar to be compared in this context. It only deals with the judiciary of the EU, 
trying to analyse its presumably ‘political’ character: why is it that political and legal 
scholars label the Court as ‘political’ or ‘activist’? 
This thesis seeks to investigate the validity of these accusations by proposing a 
synthesis of various political theories and a certain clarification of the terminology in 
the context of the European judiciary. Chapter 1 deals with the ECJ as an institution, 
discussing its functioning and its presumably constitutional character. Chapter 2 then 
focuses on the notions of ‘politics’ and ‘political’, firstly in terms of their definitions by 
various authors and consequently in terms of the various political theories of European 
integration. Chapter 3 then deals with the central question of the thesis: is the ECJ a 
political actor or not? The analysis in the third chapter is split into five dimensions: 
(1) the judges’ motivations in adjudication, (2) the appointment of judges, (3) the 
subject-matter of the Court’s adjudication, (4) the institutional balance within the 
Union, and (5) the impact of ECJ’s case-law in the MS. 
This thesis should serve as an introduction to an extremely interesting and extremely 
wide field of research. I have not even come close to exhausting all the topics that could 
be included in the study of the political role of the ECJ or courts in general. There are 
numerous works that deal with judicial activism, political aspects of the judiciary, 
comparative analyses of various courts and many other fascinating topics. What I have 
studied so far is only a degustation of my future doctoral research in this topic in which 
will further develop many of the questions which are only briefly outlined in this thesis. 
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1. The ECJ as an Institution 
“The European Court has emerged as one of the most powerful political institutions 




“The fact that the ECJ shaped European integration from the beginning 




The European Court of Justice is presumably the most powerful international court in 
the world.
15
 One could even say that it is only thanks to the ECJ that the European 
Union is more than just an ordinary international organisation.
16
 While being 
‘a guardian of the Treaties’, the ECJ actually constructs EU law and decides the future 
direction of the united Europe in various fields. Before delving deep into the analysis of 
the Court’s presumably political nature, this chapter is meant to briefly summarise the 
Court’s, composition,  functioning and the various types of procedures it deals with. 
1.1 The Organisation and Composition of the European Judiciary 
The Court of Justice of the EU is currently composed of ‘three judicial bodies’:
17
 the 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the General Court (EGC) and the Civil Service Tribunal 
(CST).
18
 With a great deal of simplification, the CST could be seen as a labour court for 
EU employment disputes, the EGC as an administrative court of the EU and the ECJ as 
                                                          
 
13
 See (Alter, 2009), p. 1. 
14
 See (Grimmel, 2011), p. 21. 
15
 Karen Alter consistently argues that the ECJ, despite its special characteristics, is only an international 
court. See also: (Koopmans, 1986); (Mancini, 1989); (Lenaerts, 1990) and (Weiler, 1993). 
16
 Professor Geert de Baere (KU Leuven) accentuates that when comparing two things, one should realise 
whether the difference between them is ‘a difference in degree’ or ‘a difference in kind’. In his opinion, 
the European Union is not different ‘in kind’ from other international organisations; it only is different ‘in 
degree’; the only thing that truly distinguishes the EU from other international organisations, it is its very 
powerful Court of Justice. 
17
 See also (Barents, 2010), pp. 709 ff. 
18
 See Article 19(1) TFEU. The Treaty only mentions the ECJ and the EGC explicitly, then it speaks 
about an open category of ‘specialised courts’. According to Article 257 TFEU, it is up to the European 
Parliament and Council to establish such ‘specialised courts’. At the moment, there is only one: the CST. 
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a constitutional court of the EU.
19
 All these courts are entrusted – within their respective 
jurisdictions – with the task of ensuring “that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed.”
20
 This Treaty Article has in fact allowed the Court to 
shape its very broad “independent sphere of influence over the years.”
21
  
The ECJ is composed of thirty-five Court members: twenty-seven judges, one from 
each MS,
22
 and eight Advocates-General,
23
 five from the biggest MS (France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the UK) and three rotating between the remaining twenty-two MS. In 
order to become a member of the Court, one needs to be nominated by a MS and 
appointed for a (renewable) term of six years “by common accord of the governments of 
the MS.”
24
 The Treaties do not explicitly require that the candidate be a citizen of the 
MS of nomination;
25
 however, the candidates need to “possess the qualifications 
required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries”
26
 




As to the procedures before the ECJ / EGC, the Court’s agenda is composed of various 





 the action for failure to act,
30
 the action for damages
31
 and the 
‘preliminary ruling mechanism,’
32
 the most frequently used procedure.
33
 
                                                          
 
19
 See (Lenaerts, et al., 2006), p. 9. 
20
 See Article 19(1) TEU. 
21
 See (De Búrca, 2003), p. 49. This claim will be analysed in chapter 3.3. 
22
 See Article 19(2) TEU. 
23
 See Article 252(1) TFEU. 
24
 See Article 19(2) TEU. For further details regarding the appointment procedure, see chaper 3.2. 
25
 See (Lenaerts, et al., 2006), p. 5. 
26
 See Article 253(1) TFEU. 
27
 See Article 19(2) TEU and Article 254 TFEU. 
28
 See Article 258 TFEU. 
29
 See Article 263 TFEU. 
30
 See Article 265 TFEU. 
31
 See Article 268 TFEU. 
32
 See Article 267 TFEU. 
33
 This enumeration is not exhaustive. There are several other procedures which are less common, such as 
the review of an international treaty, EU staff cases, the ‘arbitration clause’ procedure, etc. For a thorough 
study in European Procedural Law, see (Lenaerts, et al., 2006) (third edition forthcoming in 2013). 
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1.2 Is the ECJ a Constitutional Court? 
“But, of course, from what the Court says (constitutionally) 
we can learn a lot about what the Court is, 
or more accurately, what the Court believes itself to be, 




In the spring of 2010, Václav Klaus, the Czech President, accused the Czech 
Constitutional Court of being a political actor.
35
 In reply to this accusation, the President 
of the CCC, Pavel Rychetský said to the media: “One can hardly expect the 
Constitutional Court not to be a political body, when its main, fundamental function is 
to supervise a political body.”
36
 A similar opinion has been defended by Eliška 
Wagnerová, the former Vice-President of the CCC, who confirmed Rychetský’s 
statement and added that such an approach prevails in both legal and political circles all 
around Europe and that there is no reason to question it.
37
 
Karen Alter has consistently argued that the ECJ is an international court and that it can 
serve as a model for the study of other international courts.
38
 She admits that there are 
three “design features” which distinguish the ECJ from other international courts,
39
 but 
she refuses to see the ECJ as a constitutional court. On the contrary, many other authors 
claim that the ECJ is clearly a constitutional court, since it has formulated landmark 
legal principles which “have defined the very nature of the EU, constitutionalising it 
and distinguishing it from other international Treaties.”
40
 The classic works of Eric 
Stein and Joseph Weiler speak of the so-called ‘constitutionalisation’ of the Treaties.
41
 
                                                          
 
34
 See (Weiler, 1993), p. 418. 
35
 See (iDnes.cz, 2011). 
36
 See (iDnes.cz, 2011). 
37
 See (Wagnerová, 2012). 
38
 See (Alter, 2009), in particular Chapter 12: Private Litigants and the New International Courts. See 
also (Arnull, 2008), p. 1174: “The ECJ is widely recognised as one of the world’s most successful 
international tribunals and has been held up as a model for others.” 
39
 See (Alter, 2009), p. 32: (1) its compulsory jurisdiction, (2) the preliminary ruling mechanism, and 
(3) the possibility of non-compliance charges against MS. 
40
 See (Craig, et al., 2011), p. 63. 
41
 See (Stein, 1981) and (Weiler, 1982); see also (Dehousse, 1999), (Arnull, 2008), and (Conway, 2012). 
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Judge Lenaerts describes the functioning of the Court in three different settings: as a 
constitutional court, as a supreme court and as an administrative court, assuming 
different roles depending on what current procedure it is dealing with.
42
 When the Court 
decides disputes between institutions (mainly annulment and infringement actions), it 
acts as a constitutional court. When issuing judgments within the ‘preliminary ruling 
mechanism’, it acts as a supreme court, since it assures that EU law is uniformly applied 
throughout the Union. And when the Court offers judicial protection to individuals 
against the acts of other institutions, it acts as an administrative court.
43
 
In my opinion, there are two aspects of the ECJ which make it constitutional: (1) the 
power of judicial review vis-à-vis legislative acts, and (2) the power to interpret the 
Treaties. These powers are characteristic of constitutional courts all around the world. 
Firstly, the ECJ is endowed with the power to strike down legislation adopted by EU 
institutions. That puts it in a position of a constitutional court. Shapiro and Stone Sweet 
moreover claim that “constitutional judicial review has always been viewed as the most 
politically controversial power held by judges, precisely because its exercise obliterates 
boundaries that allegedly separate things ‘political’ from things ‘judicial’.”
44
 
Secondly, the ECJ is endowed with the power to interpret the Treaties which are at the 
top of the legal hierarchy in the EU. Weiler remarks that the Court “has, of course, 
considerable power in interpreting the Treaty and being the ultimate arbiter of its 
meaning.”
45
 Section 3.3 will illustrate that the interpretation of the Treaties by the Court 




This thesis will therefore be built on the presumption that the ECJ is indeed a 
constitutional court. Admittedly, this label could upset those who fear a strong Union, 
since it has connotations of the EU being more than just an international organisation. 
However, considering the ECJ a ‘constitutional court’ does not necessarily mean 
                                                          
 
42
 See (Lenaerts, 1991), pp. 32 ff. 
43
 See (Lenaerts, 1991), pp. 32-33. 
44
 See (Shapiro, et al., 2002), p. 142. The question of institutional balance will be dealt with in section 3.4. 
45
 See (Weiler, 1999), p. 189, footnote 3. 
46
 See also (Stone Sweet, 2000), p. 135. 
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regarding the EU as a state. In the end, ‘constitutional’ may also be understood as 
‘constitutive’, ‘constituent’, or ‘fundamental’ – and those adjectives definitely do 
represent the nature of the Treaties.
47
 
1.3 Studying the Court in a Dual Context 
Bohumil Baxa, a Czechoslovak constitutional lawyer, once pointed out that looking 
only at the legal importance of a certain institution and omitting its political importance 
means not only seeing it incompletely but also losing sight of the dynamic evolutionary 
moment which transforms a legally important institution into an institution which is 
politically meaningless or even outdated.
48
 Indeed, one does not get to know the ECJ (or 
any other institution) by only reading the relevant Treaty articles; the power and nature 
of an institution are shaped by more than just institutional provisions.  
The Treaty provisions related to the CJEU have not changed considerably over time; 
today’s Treaty wording is in fact very close to the wording in the Treaty of Rome as far 
as the Court is concerned. However, “the ECJ has not been a consistently ‘activist’ 
court at all times or in all policy spheres”
49
 and its role has fluctuated over time. 
Unfortunately, legal documents only offer a limited insight into the Court’s importance 
over time. As Andreas Grimmel rightly notes, “interdisciplinary cooperation is the 
foundation for understanding how law influences the European integration process.”
50
 
Lawyers seek to analyse issues in a strictly technical manner, distinguishing between 
matters which are of legal importance and matters which are not. Political scientists 
often simply wonder why and how things happen. The interdisciplinary research then 
makes it possible to know both: how things are and why they happen. I will demonstrate 
both in the following chapters. 
  
                                                          
 
47
 Even business corporations have their ‘constitutional’ documents; it simply means that those 
documents include the very basic rules of their functioning, just like the Treaties do for the EU. 
48
 See (Baxa, 1917), cited in (Kysela, 2011), p. 181. 
49
 See (Craig, et al., 2011), p. 64. 
50
 See (Grimmel, 2011), p. 22. 
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2. ‘Politics’ and ‘Political’ 




The European Court of Justice has been discussed by many authors, mostly scholars 
from a political science background. Although there are a handful of those who label the 
Court as a political actor, there are almost none who would define what they actually 
mean by ‘political’. As a result, the discussions led by the authors in this field often 
amount to diverging monologues rather than a sensible dialogue. Moreover, 
“constitutional lawyers and political scientists have had […] traditionally similar 
professional problem: an academic allergy to each other”
52
 – so the discussions 
sometimes slide down to a mutual criticism without any mutual understanding.
53
 
Although all the authors describe the same institution, their opinions on the ECJ differ 
to a great extent. What is controversial is that even though many of the authors share the 
same views and ideas of the Court, they simply use different labels for describing it. 
For the sake of clarity, this chapter will attempt to propose an overview of a number of 
definitions of ‘politics’ and ‘political’. After a general introduction into the terminology 
of political science, the focus will switch to expressions such as the ‘politicisation of 
judiciary’, ‘judicialisation of politics’ and ‘judicial activism’. At the end of the chapter, 
the four main political theories of European integration will be introduced. All these 
clarifications are meant to unify the terminology and offer a platform for analysis in the 
next chapters. 
                                                          
 
51
 Thomas Mann: The Magic Mountain, 1924. 
52
 See (Husa, 2011), p. 456.  
53
 I am definitely not the only researcher who stumbled upon this problem; see for example (Dyevre, 
2008) who writes that “the academic debate on courts and judicial review is still characterized, on both 
sides of the Atlantic, by a mixture of confusion and misunderstanding. Criticising the works and 
approaches of the other discipline, political scientists and lawyers often end up talking past each other.”; 
or (Trochtová, 2010) who complains about legal and political scholars “mixing apples with oranges” and 
about “bits and pieces of confusing information.” 
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2.1 Many Definitions of Political 
Even amongst political scientists, there is no single definition of politics which would 
be widely accepted.
54
 The notion of ‘political’ differs to a great extent – it has a certain 
meaning in everyday life and various other meanings in the world of social sciences or 
law. Some citizens identify ‘politics’ as a dirty word and see politicians as “power-
seeking hypocrites who conceal personal ambition behind the rhetoric of public service 
and ideological conviction.”
55
 In this sense, labelling something as ‘political’ simply 
means putting a dirty sticker on it, linking it with biased decision-making. 
Andrew Heywood proposes numerous definitions of ‘politics’. Within some of them, 
the ECJ (and any other court) would always be a political institution. Politics may be 
defined in its broadest sense as “the activity through which people make, preserve and 
amend the general rules under which they live,” as “a process of conflict resolution in 
which rival views or competing interests are reconciled with one another” as “the 
exercise of authority,” or as “a dialogue.”
56
 Labelling a court as ‘political’ under these 
definitions is not intended to imply a negative connotation, but rather indicative of its 
function as necessary societal authority in conflict resolution and rule amending. 
The ‘political’ may also be defined by drawing a line between the roles of the 
legislature and of the judiciary. The most important difference between the two is 
apparently the scope of their agenda: while the legislature may be active on its own 
initiative, the courts may only decide questions which are referred to them. Once the 
judiciary starts creating general norms instead of solving individual cases, the balance is 
disturbed. In the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, if a judge “pronounces upon a law 
without resting upon a case, he clearly steps beyond his sphere and invades that of the 
legislative authority.”
57
 However, even if the judge does rest upon a case, he needs to 
respect certain limits in order not to enter the sphere of the ‘political’. 
Bohuš Tomsa, a Czechoslovak legal theorist, distinguished two models of judicial 
decision-making. ‘Adjudication’, on the one hand, is a process where a judge recognises 
                                                          
 
54
 See (Heywood, 2007), pp. 3-23. 
55
 See (Heywood, 2007), p. 7. 
56
 See (Heywood, 2007), pp. 3-7. 
57
 See (Tocqueville, 1841), pp. 142-144. 
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and interprets previously given legal rules. ‘Legal politics’, on the other hand, is the 
activity of a judge who creates new rules on the basis of general principles inherent in 
the legal order.
58
 Another author trying to define the limits of judicial decision-making 
is Radoslav Procházka, a contemporary Slovak constitutional lawyer and politician who 
remarks that it is up to the legislator to decide what is good or bad and up to the courts 
to decide (in the boundaries defined by the legislator!) what is right or wrong.
59
 If a 
judge crosses the line delimited by the legislator, he enters the area of values which is 
reserved to the legislator. 
David Easton, a Professor of political science at the University of California, offers one 
of the most popular contemporary definitions of ‘politics’ which he describes as “the 
authoritative allocation of values for a society.”
60
 Therefore, a court that does not wish 
to be seen as a political institution must respect the rules laid down by the legislature. 
In Trop v. Dulles,
61
 the US Supreme Court entered the forbidden zone of ‘political’ 
when it ruled against the text of a statute concerning the loss of citizenship for deserting 
from the US Army. Even though the legislator had (shortly before) adopted a statute 
which was clear and precise, the Supreme Court modified it in order to reduce its 
severity. Justice Frankfurter did not agree with such a solution. In his dissenting opinion 
he wrote that the Constitution “[had] not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the 
wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do” and that the Supreme Court 
was pronouncing policy on the basis of “its own notions of what is wise or politic.”
62
 
To sum up, a court apparently deserves a label of ‘political’ when it starts drafting rules 
instead of ruling on a case (Tocqueville), when it enters the sphere of legal principles 
instead of interpreting legal text (Tomsa), when it decides what is good instead of 
deciding what is right (Procházka, Easton) or when it refuses to apply a rule drafted by 
the legislator and drafts its own instead (Justice Frankfurter). 
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2.2 ‘Judicialisation of Politics’ & ‘Politicisation of the Judiciary’ 
In the past few decades, the media overflows with two phenomena: the ‘judicialisation 
of politics’ and the ‘politicisation of the judiciary’.
63
 Although the two terms do not 
mean the same, they are often used interchangeably; not only by the media but also by 
legal and political scholars. Any definition of these notions requires a bit of 
simplification, as they cover “a very wide spectrum of different, interdependent 
problems.”
64
 However, a simplified definition is better than no definition. 
Carl Schmitt once claimed that ‘politicisation of the judiciary’ would be worse than 
‘judicialisation of politics’.
65
 He wrote this in reaction to Gerhard Anschütz, a German 
legal positivist who suggested that questions of interpretation of the German 
constitution should be assigned to the Reichsgericht. Schmitt disagreed: in his opinion, 
that would be too much of a threat to the prestige of the judiciary. Courts are only 
competent to answer legal questions, not questions of a political nature. Using the 
example of the Napoleonic Constitution, Schmitt argues that it would be more 
convenient to assign the task of interpreting the constitution to a highly political body, 
such as the senate.
66
 In his article “Das Reichsgericht als Hüter der Verfassung” (The 
Reichsgericht as the Guardian of the Constitution), Schmitt explains that the institution 
which is to be empowered with constitutional review and interpretation powers should 
be one with a very intensive political legitimacy.
67
 If the power of constitutional review 
were given to the Reichsgericht, the institution would lose its judicial character. In cases 
where the constitution is unclear, it is not for the judiciary to make up its content, since 
that would amount to judicial lawmaking which is impermissible and which leads to the 
undesirable politicisation of the judiciary. Rather, political institutions should fill in the 
gaps in the constitutional text. 
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Apparently, in Schmitt’s terminology, the ‘politicisation of judiciary’ happened when 
courts decided questions of a political nature, whereas the ‘judicialisation of politics’ 
occurred when questions of legal interpretation were passed on to political institutions 
which could legitimately interpret law beyond the limits of the written text. However, 
the understanding of these notions has changed over time and Schmitt’s definitions are 
apparently no longer applicable.
68
 What Schmitt used to call ‘politicisation of judiciary’ 
is today called ‘judicialisation of politics’, meaning ‘judicial activism’: moments when 
courts in their adjudication enter the arena of the ‘political’. And what Schmitt used to 
call ‘judicialisation of politics’ is now covered by the expression ‘political restraint’: 
instances where courts refuse to answer a certain question for its political character and 
leave the solution up to the legislator. 
2.2.1 Judicialisation of Politics: Judicial Activism 
Ran Hirschl, a contemporary political scientist from the University of Toronto, begins 
one of his articles by defining the ‘judicialisation of politics’ as “the reliance on courts 
and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, 
and political controversies.”
69
 When looking at the world’s judiciaries from a 
comparative perspective, Hirschl notices that the ‘judicialisation of politics’ is an 
increasing phenomenon all around the globe. Although courts have always touched 
questions of politics, such as human rights issues,
70
 they have recently delved deeper 
into ‘mega-politics’ – “matters of outright and utmost political significance that often 
define and divide whole polities.”
71
 
Zdeněk Kühn, a Czech legal theorist and a judge at the Czech Supreme Administrative 
Court, argues that ‘judicialisation of politics’ means the same as ‘judicial activism’, and 
that this expression is to be understood in two ways. On the one hand, ‘judicial activism 
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stricto sensu’ is such adjudication in which courts interpret highly vague legal 
principles and norms and occasionally even fills in the legal gaps, believing in the 
fictitious completeness of the legal system. On the other hand, ‘judicial activism largo 
sensu’ moreover covers any adjudication that has far-reaching political consequences.
72
 
Judge Kühn then states that both these forms of ‘judicial activism’ are an inevitable 
component of the European judiciaries and therefore it is even more important for the 
judiciaries to be absolutely independent from any bias.
73
 In other words, the more 
political the agenda of the courts gets, the more apolitical their motivation needs to be. 
2.2.2 Politicisation of the Judiciary: Political Influences 
The second expression, the ‘politicisation of the judiciary’, can nowadays be understood 
as “a question of manipulation of the judiciary administration by the politicians.”
74
 This 
phenomenon does not concern the agenda of the courts; it concerns mostly the personal, 
financial or other relationships between courts and political institutions, between judges 
and politicians. Otto Kirchheimer mentions examples such as courts composed of 
politicians or courts influenced by politicians (cabinet justice, justice on the 
telephone),
75
 other examples could include political administration of the judiciary 
(issues such as the appointment of judges and the financing of courts), trials with 
politicians, or adjudication concerning political crimes.
76
  
2.2.3 Constitutional Review: The Two Phenomena in One 
There is one field of judicial activity which in fact relates to both ‘judicialisation of 
politics’ and ‘politicisation of the judiciary’: constitutional review. On the one hand, as 
far as its substantive result is concerned, it amounts to ‘judicialisation of politics’, since 
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it allows courts to make value choices. On the other hand, if it is used by politicians as a 
tool of political competition, it amounts to ‘politicisation of judiciary’. 
Radoslav Procházka elaborates on the idea of legislators deciding what is ‘good’ and 
judges deciding what is ‘right’ and claims that in constitutional courts, this concept is 
challenged. In fact, in abstract judicial review, constitutional courts decide the question 
of ‘good’ and in concrete judicial review they decide the question of ‘right’.
77
 
2.2.4 Judges Are Becoming Politicians, Politicians are Becoming Judges 
The classical Montesquieu’s model of judges being only “the mouth of the law”
78
 does 
not seem to exist in its original form anymore.
79
 It is becoming more and more common 
that judges decide questions of policy and value choices, whereas legislators need to 
‘judge’ the constitutionality of their laws before passing them, in order not to have them 
cancelled by constitutional courts. Nowadays, “constitutional courts are seen as 
specialized de facto legislative chambers and law-makers as de facto constitutional 
judges. Traditional roles, as divided by the separation of powers scheme, are altered.”
80
 
With a little bit of exaggeration one could say that “judges are becoming politicians and 
politicians are becoming judges.”
81
 
2.3 Political Theories of European Integration 
When lawyers and political scientists study European integration (or the European 
Union in general), they focus on very different topics. I have recently attended a 
summer school where students of law and of political science discussed various topics 
in advanced EU law: it was very interesting to see the difference in their respective 
points of view. While law students saw the ECJ as the central actor in the European 
legal system, political scientists could not understand the lawyers’ obsession with the 
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Court which (from their point of view) was only an insignificant player whose decisions 
are not even enforceable.
82
 
Despite the general scepticism of political scientists towards the ECJ, some political 
scientists in fact do study the Court and its role in European integration.
83
 There are two 
main streams of thinking in this field: intergovernmentalism (emphasising the role of 
the MS), and neo-functionalism (based on its famous spill-over theory). There are two 
more ‘schools’ of opinion: neo-rationalism (focusing on the actors’ strategies) and 
supranationalism (stressing the independence of EU institutions).
84
 The following 
subsections will try to offer some insight into these four theories. 
2.3.1 Neo-rationalism: Geoffrey Garrett 
Neo-rationalism sees both the ECJ and the MS as strategic rational actors.
85
 The MS 
have concluded an international agreement but they realise that “it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to write complete contracts [Treaties]. Delegating authority to the ECJ is 
thus essential to the efficient functioning of the rule of law in Europe.”
86
 
The rationality of the MS means that they have created an arbiter of their disputes and 
they are willing to follow its jurisprudence as long as it offers them more benefits than 
disadvantages. The rationality of the ECJ is manifested in its ‘careful’ decision-making 
which endeavours not to manifestly oppose the other actors’ interests.
87
 
In this context of reciprocal rationalism, the jurisprudence of the ECJ should be 
predictable and calculable. Expectably, the ECJ will always try to uphold its credibility 
and authority and to rule in a way which will be accepted by the MS, since without 
acceptance by MS governments, the Court’s rulings would be without effect.
88
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2.3.2 Intergovernmentalism: Andrew Moravcsik 
Intergovernmentalism is based on the idea of democratic legitimacy: it is the MS 
governments, not the Union institutions, who decide about the crucial issues and who 
have final decision power. Just like neo-rationalism, intergovernmentalism also stresses 
the necessity of acceptance of the Court’s case-law, but for a different reason: the 
absolute dependence on the will of MS who play the role of principals. According to 
intergovernmentalists, the ECJ is nothing more than an agent of the MS’ interests. 
The principal-agent theory has been introduced by Andrew Moravcsik, the main 
representative of intergovernmentalism. Supranational actors do not have much power; 
they are only agents of the MS who still remain the driving forces behind integration.
89
 
A nice overview of the intergovernmentalist theory is offered by Andreas Grimmel who 
writes: “The Court has to live with the persistent fear of being overruled […] by the MS 
[…] if its adjudication does not match the aggregated interests of the MS.”
90
 
2.3.3 Neo-functionalism: Burley and Mattli/Slaughter 
Neo-functionalism is probably the most popular theory of European integration. In a 
strong contrast to intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism claims that national 
governments are extremely weak in the political arena of European judiciary; they are 
actually being completely ‘circumvented’ by national courts within the scheme of the 
‘preliminary ruling mechanism’.
91
 The strong actors in the European legal system are 
national courts, private litigants, the European Commission and the ECJ itself.
92
 
The central idea of neo-functionalism is the spillover theory: “because of the 
interconnection of policy areas, integration in one would lead inevitably to integration 
in another.”
93
 The spillover may be either functional, meaning that integration in one 
policy area brings integration in another policy area; or political, meaning that the 
integration creates new political pressures and those political pressures push for even 
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The main representatives of neo-functionalism, Anne-Marie Burley (now Slaughter) 
and Walter Mattli, describe law as a mask and a shield: law may function as an 
instrument to cover political motivations, but only as far as it remains ‘legal’. “Law 
functions as a mask for politics. […] The result is that important political outcomes are 
debated and decided in the language and logic of law. […] At a minimum, the margin of 
insulation necessary to promote integration requires that judges themselves appear to 
be practicing law rather than politics. Their political freedom of action thus depends on 
a minimal degree of fidelity to both substantive law and the methodological constraints 
imposed by legal reasoning. In a word, the staunch insistence on legal realities as 
distinct from political realities may in fact be a potent political tool.”
95
 Everything thus 
stands and falls on trustworthiness: if the ECJ reasons its decisions with arguments 
which seem to have a legal ground, the case-law will be trustworthy and accepted. On 
the contrary, if its arguments are clearly politically motivated, its legitimacy as a non-
politically motivated actor is compromised. 
2.3.4 Supranationalism: Alec Stone Sweet 
Supranationalism is a contemporary theory that is becoming increasingly popular. It 
sees the Union institutions as independent actors and the ECJ as a crucial policy-maker 
who has had a great influence on the creation of EU law and doctrines. 
Alec Stone Sweet, one of the main representatives of supranationalism perceives the 
whole story of European integration as “a dramatic performance on the grand stage of 
the European Court of Justice.”
96
 Stone Sweet refuses the principal-agent theory 
proposed by intergovernmentalists; rather, he claims that the ECJ is an actor who is 
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fully independent from MS’ will. Moreover, it can produce ‘unintended consequences’ 
that were not foreseen by the founding fathers of the Union.
97
  
2.3.5 Criticism of the Four Theories 
The introduced theories are four possible ways of explaining the process of European 
integration. Neither of them is perfect, but neither has been absolutely denied. They 
often criticise each other, pointing at their drawbacks and misunderstandings. 
Neo-rationalism, for example, has received two main points of criticism. Firstly, Arthur 
Dyevre claims that Geoffrey’s theory “is premised on a wholly erroneous 
understanding of the preliminary ruling mechanism and its legal effect.”
98
 Secondly, 
Andrew Moravcsik points out the extreme costs of non-compliance: it would not be 
rational for MS to disobey the Court’s rulings,
99
 since such disobedience would trigger 
an infringement procedure pursuant to Article 258 TFEU which could lead to severe 
sanctions against the non-compliant MS. 
The intergovernmentalist idea is criticised for being too simplistic in its claim that the 
ECJ either decides as an agent of the MS or will be overturned. In fact, the problem of 
overruling may be much more complicated as it seems at first sight. Martin Shapiro 
points out that the establishment of a supranational court empowered to resolve disputes 
between MS is a second-best solution next to the direct dispute resolution among the 
MS themselves.
100
 That means in practice that “when the ECJ chose policies different 
from the ones the Council collectively had or would have chosen for itself, the Court 
could get away with such policies so long as they were ones that some of the MS found 
to be acceptable choices, even if not their most favoured choices.”
101
 The legislative 
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process is too complicated, it involves too many actors and it is practically impossible 
for MS to put it in motion.
102
 
Neo-functionalism has been criticised for overlooking the global context: Stanley 
Hoffman points out that “neo-functionalists predicted an inexorable progress to further 
integration – but this was all predicated on an internal dynamic, and implicitly assumed 
that the international background conditions would remain fixed.”
103
Another point of 
criticism aimed at neo-functionalists is that it is already outdated: “Although neo-
functionalist theory nearly fitted events in the 1950s and the early 1960s, subsequent 
events led to its demise and the rise of intergovernmentalist explanations.”
104
 
Supranationalism often receives criticism for being too ambitious and for disregarding 
the interests and even the sovereignty of the MS. Nowadays we can witness these 
tensions in the rulings of the MS’ constitutional courts which signalise their 
unwillingness to accept the Court’s jurisprudence as absolutely unlimited.
105
 But 
already in May 1962, Charles de Gaulle expressed a critical opinion: “These ideas 
(supranationalism) might appeal to certain minds but I entirely fail to see how they 
could be put into practice, even with six signatures at the foot of a document. Can we 
imagine France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg being 
prepared on matters of importance to them in the national or international sphere, to do 
something that appeared wrong to them, merely because others had ordered them to do 
so? Would the peoples of France, of Germany, of Italy, of the Netherlands, of Belgium, 
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or of Luxembourg ever dream of submitting to laws passed by foreign parliamentarians 




There are two points of reflection which should be mentioned in this context. 
Firstly, it is essential to look at European integration in the context of both its history 
and its present development. The role of the Union and of the MS, the importance of the 
national and supranational players, the nature of the institutions: all that changes either 
due to its legal background (such as legislation, Treaty amendments, ECJ’s case-law) or 
due to its political background (the personalities of those in charge, such as national 
politicians, MEPs or ECJ judges, the political situation in the MS, the economic 
situation, etc.). Rather than calling the ECJ a ‘political actor’ en bloc, one should look at 
particular moments and even at particular cases to see whether the Court acts politically. 
Secondly, supranationalism may also be seen as a value.
107
 It is not only a technique, 
but also a core value of the EU, a shared interest of the MS, a decision to build an entity 
‘unified in diversity’. It is the willingness to work on a common project and to achieve 
common goals while preserving the differences in nationalities and exercising a mutual 
respect. If the idea of European integration is studied from this point of view, then all 
four political theories of integration may actually make sense in different contexts. 
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3. The ECJ as a Political Actor 
3.1 Personalities of Judges 
“Judges are taken to be non-political figures while they interpret the law impartially 
[…] but they may be accused of being ‘political’ 




In Joseph Weiler’s renowned article ‘Europe: The Case Against the Case for 
Statehood’, Weiler speculates whether it is appropriate for judges to give public 
statements about the cases they decide, the opinions they have and the reasons they 
employ for deciding cases. Should the judges talk about these topics? Do we want them 
to reveal the real motivations of their decisions? In Weiler’s words:
 
“We love the idea of 
judicial neutrality, the notion of being judged by laws and not men, whilst at the same 
time we recognize that willy-nilly we are judged by men. We […] cannot decide whether 
justice and the appearance of justice are better served by knowing as much as possible 
about the judge and his biases or knowing as little as possible. […] the hermeneutic 
sensibility of the judge, becoming the mental equivalent of a ‘preamble’ to any act of 
interpretation […] is what we fear though that, too, is what we want.”
109
 
Weiler’s argument obviously builds on a premise that there is something more behind a 
judgment than just purely legal reasons; he only asks whether we want to know about it. 
Such a premise is apparently widely shared in the contemporary legal theory and 
practice. Judicial decision-making is not seen as a mere mechanical subsumption of 
factual situations under legal norms; rather, it is seen as a process which requires 
thinking, attitudes and decisions. 
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Eliška Wagnerová recently expressed a rather radical opinion concerning her idea of a 
‘good’ constitutional judge, stating that constitutional law has its own methodology and 
that it needs to be treated differently. Thus, a judge who is only used to mechanically 




From this point of view, ECJ judges are in a situation similar to any other constitutional 
judges. They do more than just mechanic subsumption. Their job requires a great deal 
of thinking, attitudes and decisions. The cases they solve often reach beyond the limits 
of the written law. Their judgments often amount to policy choices. And in such a 
setting, the remark of Andrew Heywood cited at the beginning of this section is very 
convenient: if judges judge by personal preferences, they should not be surprised if they 
are ever accused of being political. 
The question posed in this section is: does the system of the European judiciary offer 
sufficient guarantees to insure that judges are not political, that the adjudication of the 
ECJ is not shaped by their individual political (or ‘policy’) preferences? As a 
background to this issue, three leading theories of the twentieth century will be 
addressed: the normativist theory, American Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies. 
3.1.1 The Normativist Theory: Hans Kelsen, František Weyr 
According to the normativist theory,
111
 law is an autonomous system which is only 
defined by itself. Law thus needs to be cleared from any non-legal influences, including 
the personality of a judge. For normativists, the judgment in Trop v. Dulles
112
 (analysed 
in section 2.1) would not be legally valid, since it contradicted the norm which applied 
to it. In the normativist theory, every legal norm needs to be justified by another legal 
norm of a higher standing in the hierarchy of norms, only then a legal system will be 
functional. Within such a legal system, a binding rule cannot be derived from anything 
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The application of the pure theory of law to judicial decision-making is thus clear: if a 
judge wishes to issue a legally binding judgment,
114
 his arguments must be based on 
legal norms. If he finds arguments in any other field, his decision will not be legally 
valid, since “words uttered in a certain room or inscribed in a certain text get their status 
as legal decisions only in the context of functioning legal system.”115 Any adjudication is 
thus confined within the limits of law and the law is confined within itself which leaves 
the judges with a very limited field of arguments. 
3.1.2 American Legal Realism: O. W. Holmes, Carl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank 
A quite different view on the judicial decision-making and its grounds was offered by 
legal realism in the early twentieth century. American legal realists focused mainly on 
the judiciary
116
 and their claim was very clear: adjudication based on purely legal 
motivations is fiction; it is necessary to look beyond the legal arguments, since every 
judge comes from a certain background that determines his opinions and influences his 
decisions. Legal realists argued that “lawyers should look behind the language of 
judicial opinions and the “paper rules” of the statute book invoked by these opinions in 
order to uncover the judges’ “real” motives.”
117
 For those who are sceptical to such a 
claim, K. G. Wurzel proposes an exercise: imagine inviting Chinese judges to 
adjudicate on the basis of your laws: you would find out that they decide quite 
differently than your own judges.
118
 
Legal realists emphasise the importance of a judge’s personality in his decision-making: 
his opinions, his moral judgments, his cultural and social profile, maybe even his 
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political preferences may play a role.
119
 Judges’ education also has a significant 
influence on adjudication: some judges only think in the intentions of law, some may be 
educated in economics, sociology or political science. If judges are seen as elite of the 
society then good education in the field of social sciences may even be expected as a 
matter of course. Justice Louis Brandeis quotes one of his professors who appealed on 
his students saying that “a lawyer who has not studied economics and sociology is very 
apt to become a public enemy.”
120
 American Legal Realism thus clearly stands in 
opposition to the normative theory. Law is not a system confined to itself; it needs to be 
perceived and interpreted in the light of other fields of human life, namely economics 
and the society as a whole. 
3.1.3 Critical Legal Studies: Duncan Kennedy 
A few decades later, the claims of the American Legal Realism were exaggerated to an 
extreme by a movement called Critical Legal Studies represented mainly by Duncan 
Kennedy. The main claim of CLS was that law and politics are inseparable. Law is in 
nothing else than a tool for enforcing politics, legal arguments are simply “covers for 
the real motives behind the courts’ policies and the political agenda of the sitting 
judges,”
121
courts are by definition ‘political institutions’
122
 and judges are “half-
conscious, in a state of denial in respect of the ideological element in their judicial 
behaviour, and therefore acting in ‘bad faith’.”
123
 
3.1.4 The Place of Non-Legal Motivations in the Contemporary Judiciary 
Federico Mancini wrote in 1980 that “judicial decisions may be politically motivated, 
but their authors […] would never dream of publicly acknowledging this fact or acting 
in such a way as to make it explicit.”
124
 Of course, judges will always look for legal 
reasons of their findings, whether in order to cover their political motivations (CLS), in 
order to subsequently support their original ‘feeling’ about the case (ALR) or in order to 
grant legal validity to their arguments (the normativist theory). It is thus difficult to find 
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out just by looking at the reasoning whether the judgment was truly motivated by the 
legal reasons or whether the judge followed any non-legal motivations. 
Possible non-legal motivation of judges is a general problem of the judiciary, not a 
problem specific to the European environment.
125
 Grimmel argues that judges can never 
be totally free from personal considerations. There is always a danger that a judge will 
involve his own opinions, possibly political, in his decision-making. And that brings us 
back to Weiler’s question: do we want to know? In case we do, let us ask: if Chinese 
judges took up the positions at the ECJ today, what would happen to its case-law? 
Clearly, the world of judicial decision-making is not black and white. Neither legal 
normativism, nor Critical Legal Studies give a truthful impression about the judiciary’s 
functioning. The question then is: in the many shadows of grey, where should the line 
be drawn as far as non-legal motivations of judges are concerned? 
Judges should not be seen as advocates of certain ideologies, as members of the ‘ruling 
class’ or as servants of repressive states, since that would make them ‘political 
actors’,
126
 that would bring the judiciary too close to ‘the black’. Still, judges cannot 
forget where they come from; they will always be influenced by their social and cultural 
background. When Judge Schiemann was asked about the personalities at the ECJ, he 
replied: “We've got mixtures of professional judges, former politicians, former civil 
servants, former professors, and they each bring something to the table which is 
actually quite useful, and sometimes you will find that the mental approach of the 
professors lines up on one side, and the judge's lines up on the other, which is quite 
interesting, rather than, as it were, national alignments or religions alignments or 
anything of that kind.”
127
 From Judge Schiemann’s perspective, political motivations do 
not play a significant role at the ECJ. But just in case they did, would there be tools to 
limit them? 
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3.1.5 The European Solution: The Four Guarantees 
The judicial system of the EU employs various instruments which endeavour to secure 
judicial independence and to minimise possible non-legal motivations. One of them is 
common to the judiciaries in general: the Court is a judicial institution with all the 
guarantees that come with it: the institutional independence on other ‘branches’ 
(including both the geographical remoteness from the other institutions and the full self-
administration of the Luxembourgish judiciary), the impossibility of lobbying, the 
financial and social prestige of being a judge, and others. 
Secondly, independence is explicitly required from the members of the Court. The 
Treaty states that judges and AGs of the Court “shall be chosen from persons whose 
independence is beyond doubt.”
128
 This provision should ensure that a person with very 
strong political ties should not be appointed to the Court. The guarantee of 
independence is reinforced by a Panel composed of professionals on the supra-national 
level.
129
 Moreover, once nominated and appointed, the judges and AGs have to “take an 
oath to perform [their] duties impartially and conscientiously and to preserve the 
secrecy of the deliberations of the Court.”
130
 
Thirdly, the members of the Court represent the interests of the Union, not the interests 
of their respective MS.
131
 For this reason, rulings are issued collectively, in the name of 
the Court as an institution, not in the name of individual judges. Even though every case 
has its Judge Rapporteur who drafts the case, this person has to write the opinion of the 
whole chamber (composed of three, five or thirteen judges), notwithstanding his or her 
own opinion. Since the deliberations are secret and since concurring and dissenting 
opinions do not exist at the ECJ, the voting and the opinions of the judges remain 
unknown. European judiciary is thus always a ‘team game’, not a ‘one-man-show’ (the 
only exception being the role of Advocate General). On the one hand, this system 
encourages discourse among the judges and protects the judges’ independence by 
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shielding them from any possible control by their respective MS. On the other hand, it 
leads to a lack of judicial transparency and it builds the EU legal system on the fiction 
that only one solution is feasible, which is rarely so.
132
 
Fourthly, every judgment needs to be reasoned and signed by the members of the 
chamber.
133
 This is probably the most problematic of all the guarantees since the Court 
receives a great deal of criticism for insufficient reasoning of its case-law; see for 




 or Michal Bobek.
136
 This 
problem has also been admitted by Judge Schiemann, who stated: “Well, it is said that a 
camel is a horse designed by a committee. […] you hammer things out in the course of 
sitting round a table, and then having hammered it out, there's a temptation to get shot 
of the thing by sending it to the printers. In an ideal world, you would sit back and 
redraft the thing again from beginning to end so that it has a cohesive whole, but that 
then occupies time, and one has a balancing act to do.”
137
 In fact, it was often due to 
insufficient reasoning that the Court was labelled as political.  
3.1.6 Conclusion: Politically Motivated? 
Looking back at Andrew Heywood’s statement at the beginning of this chapter, ECJ 
judges could quite easily be accused of being political, especially since their work 
requires thinking, attitudes and decisions. One can never know what is hidden in a 
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judge’s mind and what the real reasons of adjudication are. This led the advocates of 
Critical Legal Studies to believe that every legal argument is only a mask for a political 
opinion, very similar to what the neo-functionalists claim about the ECJ’s arguments: 
law is only a mask and a shield for hidden politics. 
It is however crucial to realise that not all non-legal motivations are necessarily 
political. As legal realists have rightly shown, judges are predetermined by many other 
influences of cultural, social or educational character; this was confirmed by Judge 
Schiemann when he claimed that the background of the judges matters more than their 
political ideas. And even the normative theory suggests that the sanction for departing 
from legal norms is not the label of political, but the loss of legal validity of a judgment. 
Moreover, the European judiciary has introduced a number of guarantees that should 
neutralise possible political profiles of the judges, including the general guarantees of 
judicial independence, the collective character of the Court’s rulings and the obligation 
to reason judgments. Given a combination of these elements, it is quite improbable that 
a judge would be able to use the position to promote his own political agenda. 
3.2 Selection of Judges: A Double-Check 
The position of a judge or an Advocate General at the Court of Justice in Luxembourg 
is undoubtedly a very prestigious one, presumably one of the “dream careers” for EU 
lawyers. However, being an excellent lawyer and a specialist in the field of EU law does 
not suffice to get the job. In order to become a Court member, the candidate must be 
nominated by his or her national government and newly also approved by a panel 
composed of judicial authorities at the supra-national level. These, in fact, are two 
layers of possible political background of the selection process. 
3.2.1 Nomination by National Governments 
The first step in the appointment procedure is the nomination by the national 
government. The EU does not limit the MS in their selection in any way; there is only a 
requirement of the candidates’ independence. Article 19(2) TFEU states: “The Judges 
and the Advocates-General of the Court of Justice and the Judges of the General Court 
shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who satisfy the 
conditions set out in Articles 253 and 254 TFEU.” Article 253 TFEU repeats the 
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requirement of independence and adds that the judges and AGs of the Court of Justice 
need to “possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices in their respective countries” or to be “jurisconsults of recognised competence.” 
Article 254 TFEU imposes similar conditions on the judges of the General Court. 
The selection procedure at the national level thus remains unregulated. As the MS are 
not much limited in this field, the nomination may have a political background at the 
national level. There is always a chance that a position in Luxembourg may be offered 
either to those who deserve a reward or to those who need to be removed from national 
politics. Barents writes: “That this has occurred is a public secret.”
138
 
3.2.2 Article 255 Panel 
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a new institution, the so-called “Article 255 Panel”, 
which is meant to “give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of 
Judge and Advocate-General of the Court of Justice and the General Court before the 
governments of the MS make the appointments referred to in Articles 253 and 254.”
139
 
The new provision originates in “the criticism of the secrecy surrounding that 
appointment procedure as well as the possibility of political nomination to the EU 
Courts.”
140
 The Panel was thus created to discourage the possible political nominations 
and to guarantee the independence and professional qualification of the candidates.
141
 
This was confirmed by Judge Skouris, the President of the Court, in a document where 
he wrote that the role of the Panel should select the candidates with “the most suitable 
high-level experience to perform the duties of a judge.”
142
 
However, the new procedure has two drawbacks. Firstly, as Barents rightly remarks, 
“although the panel procedure may make MS more demanding as to the choice of 
candidates, political nominations are not excluded.”
143
 Secondly, the opinions of the 
                                                          
 
138
 See (Barents, 2010), p. 712. 
139
 See Article 255 TFEU. 
140 
See (Barents, 2010), p. 712. 
141
 See also (Chalmers, et al., 2010), p. 144: “The system of appointment was introduced […] to prevent 
the over-politicisation of the process.” 
142
 See Cover Note 5195/10 [2010]. 
143
 See (Barents, 2010), p. 713-714. 
 37   
Panel are not public and the whole system may thus create yet another level of potential 
political background behind the Court members’ nomination. 
3.2.3 Conclusion: Politically Influenced? 
The Court’s ‘politicisation’ in the process of the judges’ appointment is a matter of 
speculation. In 2010, the Panel assessed several candidates for the functions of judges at 
the ECJ and at the EGC, the story has already been told in the introduction. The Panel 
as it functions today cuts both ways: on the one hand, it may eliminate political 
nominations from the MS, but on the other hand, it may have its own political 
motivations. The solution which could eliminate this imperfection is transparency: if the 
Panel publishes its opinions on the respective candidates with a reasoning explaining 
their (un)suitability, then the guarantee at the EU level will be more efficient. 
3.3 Policy Choices: The ECJ as an Artist 
"There are three kinds of judge: the artisan, a veritable automaton who, using only his 
hands, produces mass judgments in industrial quantities, without lowering himself to 
consider the human aspects or the social order; the craftsman, who uses his hands and 
his brain, using traditional interpretative methods, which inevitably lead him merely to 
represent the legislature’s intention; and the artist, who, using his hands, his head and 
his heart, broadens the horizon for citizens, without losing sight of reality or of specific 
circumstances. Although they are all needed in the fulfilment of the judicial function, 
the Court of Justice, in the exercise of its proper role, has always identified itself 
with the last kind, especially now that the constant evolution of the ideas 
which inspired the creation of the Community has slowed down."
 
 
– AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
144
 
The European Union is a political project. It has been built around certain values and 
policies which were determined by the founding fathers in the 1950s and carved out into 
the primary law of the European Communities. The European Union as a project is also 
open and dynamic. The framework designed sixty years ago has been shaped through 
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various events in the history of European integration. The original ambition was to help 
the reconstruction of after-war Europe, to maintain peace on the European continent and 
to make the economy more effective.
145
 Today we have a Union which is far from what 
the founding fathers intended: a Union which guarantees citizens of the MS a 
“fundamental status” of a Union citizen, a Union which has its own legal system that is 
superior to and directly applicable in national courts, a Union which cares not only 
about economic but also about social equality of its citizens, a Union which pursues 
foreign policy through its own diplomatic service, and much more. Why is today’s EU 
so much different from the original EC; and how has it happened? 
Today’s EU is very different because in various moments, various actors transformed it 
at various steps. The EU institutions created a wide variety of legislative acts, the MS 
adopted Treaty revisions and the ECJ issued judgments in various fields. These steps 
went hand in hand, influencing one another and transforming the original 
intergovernmental EC into the supranational EU as we know it today. 
Apparently, the ECJ has played a significant role in this process, transforming the 
founding treaties from an institutional treaty into a constitution
146
 and bringing about 
the changes and innovations crucial for the development of the European legal system. 
It has shown itself as a central policy-maker when it established direct effect in Van 
Gend
147
 and supremacy in Costa
148
 and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, when it laid 
down conditions for state liability in Francovich,
149





 when it expanded the Parliament’s power in Les Verts,
152
 or when it made 
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 Too many stories 
have already been told about these cases, too many authors have already analysed them 
in depth; this thesis therefore does not have the ambition to do the same over again. 
Instead, it poses a question why such crucial policy choices have not been made by a 
political institution,
155
 why it was the ECJ that made those steps and how that was 
possible. 
3.3.1 Transforming the Union: A Tool and an Arena 
To be powerful, the ECJ needed a tool and an arena: it transformed the Union by the 
tool of teleological interpretation and in the arena of the preliminary ruling mechanism. 
A ‘creative’ reading of the Treaties has always been the favourite strategy of the 
Court.
156
 Like any other court, the ECJ uses a plurality of interpretation methods;
157
 
Judge Lenaerts speaks about three “primary methods”: literal interpretation (text), 
systematic interpretation (context) and teleological interpretation (purpose).
158
 Within 
teleological interpretation, judges enjoy a wide margin of discretion: they can afford to 
go beyond the limits of the written text and to enter the area of values and principles.  
The teleological methodology of the ECJ finds its basis mainly in Article 19(1) TEU 
which introduces the principle of ‘rule of law’ and which empowers the Court to 
“ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.” 
This legal basis has been used as a justification for many grand decisions of the ECJ;
159
 
it has happened “in the name of preserving ‘the rule of law’” that the Court has been 
able to develop “principles of a constitutional nature […] which bind the EU 
institutions and MS when they act within the sphere of EU law.”
160
 Some authors claim 
that the ECJ “gives the interpretation most likely to further what the Court considers 
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that provision sought to achieve”;
161
 however, the Court may hardly know what the 
provisions sought to achieve, as there are no travaux prépartoires available. The 
interpretations given by the Court therefore very often create something out of nothing; 
the judges indeed become artists, as suggested by AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. 
If teleological interpretation is the ‘tool’ by which the ECJ decides important policy 
questions, then the preliminary ruling mechanism is the ‘arena’ where most of such 
policy questions are resolved. An overwhelming majority of the crucial decisions issued 
by the ECJ came up in answer to national courts’ references. Through them, the ECJ 
was able “to insert itself into national debates regarding the relationship of European 
law to national law, and to harness national courts as enforcers of ECJ decisions.”
162
 
3.3.2 ‘More than an Agreement’: The Building Blocks of the EU Legal Order 
Not all, but certainly many of the crucial and transformative policy choices happened in 
Luxembourg. The doctrines developed in the Court’s case-law, although technically 
legal, have had a substantial impact on the political formation of the EU. As Karen Alter 
puts it, these legal interpretations “became politically transformative” and the ECJ 
“became a political actor that was capable of transforming European and international 
politics.”
163
 At the same time, the most important cases often lack a solid legal basis.  
In his theory (analysed above), Bohuš Tomsa tried to draw a line between adjudication 
and legal politics: ‘adjudication’ sticks to the text of written law, while ‘legal politics’ 
goes beyond the text and interprets law on the basis of values and principles. When 
looking at the ECJ and its landmark cases, we have to admit that in the context of 
Tomsa’s terminology the Court is not only ‘political’, it is in fact ‘super-political’, since 
it does not only create law on the basis of legal principles but it even creates legal 
principles on the basis of the ‘spirit’ of the Treaties. 
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The first time that the Court used this ‘super-political’ method of creating legal 
principles was in the case of Van Gend.
164
 On the basis of “the spirit, the general 
scheme and the wording of the Treaty” the Court ruled that the Treaty is “more than an 
agreement” and created the principle of direct effect which brought about an incredible 
shift in the character of the whole EU legal system, entrusting individual litigants with 
the role of guarding the integrity of the European legal order.
165
 Similarly in Costa,
166
 
the ECJ built its argumentation on the basis of “the terms and the spirit of the Treaty” 
and pronounced the principle of supremacy of EU law over national legal rules which 
was confirmed and intensified in the subsequent case-law.
167
 By the same token, in 
Francovich
168
 the Court ruled that “the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss 
and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law […] is 
inherent in the system of the Treaty”
169
 even though there was absolutely no sign of 
such a principle in the primary law. It is through these principles that the interlocutors 
of the European legal order have gained power: individual litigants may claim their EU 
rights in national courts and the EU law is shaped by the preliminary ruling mechanism. 
When Judge Lenaerts writes about “text, context and purpose,”
170
 when AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer writes about a judge who decides “using his hands, his head and his 
heart” and when the Court of the 1960s writes about “the spirit, the general scheme and 
the wording of the Treaty,” they all mean the same. With his hands, a judge interprets 
the text of the Treaty, with his head he interprets its general scheme and with his heart 
he looks for its spirit. What may be a little uncomforting is the surplus of the Court’s 
creativity and the lack of reasoning. When issuing its landmark decisions, the Court 
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created an atmosphere that everything is legal and obvious, instead of admitting that it 
was a matter of a policy choice with two (or more) credible solutions.
171
 
In the most important moments of European integration, the Court was creative, and 
since the cases before it were by their very nature ‘policy choices’, it was in fact 
‘politically creative’. Craig and De Búrca remark that “all constitutional courts must 
engage with political issues, but, given the unaccountability of courts, the nature and 
origin of the ‘unwritten’ values which they promote should be critically scrutinized, as 
should the extent to which their decisions seem to depart from what their express 
powers would appear to allow.”
172
 This comes, in the end, back to the question of 
reasoning which is often insufficient, as has already been argued above, and for which 
the Court often receives severe criticism. 
On the other hand, Andreas Grimmel defends the Court in this context: “On the 
incomplete basis set by politics, it could not have been a surprise that the ECJ had to 
emphasize teleological arguments (relying on spirit and purpose of the Treaty) instead 
of starting with literal arguments. […] Forced to act without being able to rely on a 
systematic constitutional order or a long history of case law, it was not only 
consequent, understandable, and legitimate within the legal context to emphasize 
teleological arguments, it was also necessary to secure legal security and must be seen 
as a “European way” of judicial interpretation, characteristic and symptomatic of the 
foundational period. In this sense, the claim that the ECJ is a “political Court” or has 
been activist is neither convincing, nor can it be acceptable. Not judicial activism, but 




Grimmel introduces an extremely important point. It is always crucial to see the 
institutional context of the Court’s creative judgments. In the instances where the Court 
steps in for the inactive legislator, its case-law is much more legitimate than in the 
instances where the Court surprisingly develops new legal principles. However, it is 
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questionable whether cases such as Van Gend, Costa or Francovich were reactions to a 
lack of legislative action. Rather, they went beyond what the legislator intended.  
3.3.3 ‘Message in a Bottle that Changed Europe’:
174
 The Cassis Case 
The Cassis case
175
 illustrates the second type of the ECJ’s creative cases: those which 
fill in a gap in legislative vacuum, which are surprising, yet still accepted as legitimate. 
Cassis came up in a context where the Union wished to build an internal market but the 
legislator did not do anything in order to reach that goal. When French alcohol 
producers wanted to export their product to Germany, they did not succeed since their 
blackcurrant liquor of 15% was not strong enough to be qualified as alcohol in 
Germany. Clearly, it was the MS’ will not to open their frontiers too much, yet the 
Court decided to take the initiative and to introduce a new policy of ‘mutual 
recognition’, stating that there is “no valid reason why, provided that they have been 
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the MS, alcoholic beverages should not be 
introduced into any other MS.”
176
 This ruling marked the beginning of the ‘new 
approach to harmonisation’ which meant that “it is possible to implement trade between 
states while still allowing MS to maintain their own laws and avoiding the need for 
harmonisation,”
177
 and it lead to the adoption of the Single European Act of 1985 which 
is a crucial Treaty amendment.  
The legitimacy of the Cassis case is different from the cases mentioned in the previous 
subsection for two reasons: the setting in which the Cassis case was decided and the 
follow-up of the judgment. 
Firstly, the Cassis case was decided in a specific context of the 1970s known as a period 
of ‘Euro-sclerosis’. The Court stepped in “at a time when progress towards completing 
the Single Market through legislative harmonization was hindered by institutional 
inaction.”
178
 Cassis, unlike other cases, was legitimated by a solid legal basis, since the 
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ECJ only “rendered the Treaty and EC legislation effective when the provisions had not 
been implemented as required by the political institutions and the MS.”
179
 
Secondly, Cassis was followed-up by a pro-active reaction of other Union institutions. 
Karen Alter points out that the importance of the Court’s rulings is determined by their 
acceptance by other political actors.
180
 Fabio Wasserfallen argues similarly when he 
writes that “the judiciary can only influence integration effectively, when its 
considerations and doctrines become incorporated in the policy-making process.”
181
 
The Cassis case is a good practical illustration of this argument: even though it was not 
the first ruling in the field of internal market, it is definitely the most influential one. 
The Dassonville ruling issued five years before Cassis was in fact very similar, but due 
to the lack of interest of other institutions, it never became as famous as Cassis.
182
 
3.3.3 Conclusion: Politically Creative? 
Both previous subsections introduce deal with very creative cases that brought a 
significant change to the development of the EU. They have some characteristics in 
common: they did not rest upon the individual case being decided (Tocqueville: 
political!), they entered the sphere of legal politics (Tomsa: political!) and they made 
value choices (Easton: political!) about what was good rather than about what was right 
(Procházka: political!). However, they were issued in a different context and therefore 
Grimmel’s defence of the Court introduced above cannot be applied equally to all of 
them. While Cassis was indeed a case issued in the period of legislative vacuum, 
subsequently accepted by the legislator and translated into the Single European Act, 
Van Gend, Costa and Francovich have been controversial for decades. 
The Court has clearly been a central policy-maker in the EU. The policy-making power 
of the Court is however not unlimited, since “the judicial power is by its nature devoid 
of action: it must be put in motion in order to produce a result.”
183
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In the light of the integrationist theories introduced above, the setting is both neo-
functional and supranational at the same time. A lot of power is in the hands of the 
‘interlocutors’, such as private litigants who bring their actions, national courts who 
refer questions to the ECJ and apply EU law back in their respective jurisdictions, or the 
Union institutions that may decide to transform the Court’s case-law into legislative 
acts. The ECJ is thus limited from both ends: on the one hand, it only deals with cases 
that come before it, on the other hand its case-law only has an impact if other actors 
accept it. Still, what happens between these limits is left completely up to the ECJ. The 
playing field between the two side fences remains open to the Court’s artistic 
interpretation and the supranational Court is thus free to be ‘politically creative’. 
3.4 Institutional Balance within the Union 
Although many public policy matters still remain beyond the purview of the courts, 
there has been a growing legislative deference to the judiciary, an increasing and often 
welcomed intrusion of the judiciary into the prerogatives of legislatures and executives, 




This chapter will analyse three different examples of the interaction between the Court 
and other EU institutions. The first example concerns a typical ‘judicial review’ case 
where the Court examined the validity of a legislative act and then offered further 
guidance to the legislator. The second case shows how the legislator delegated the 
policy choice to the ECJ in the questions of corporate mobility but the Court refused to 
make the decision. The third example concerns a series of cases on the judicial 
protection of individuals during which the EGC issued a ruling which was in fact 
admittedly addressed to the Treaty drafters. What all these cases have in common is that 
they illustrate the relationship between the judiciary and the legislator and they show 
that in certain cases the ECJ may be very ‘politically influential’. 
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3.4.1 Giving the Legislator a Second Chance: The Tobacco Saga 
Tobacco Advertising
185
 highlights the interaction between the Court and the 
legislator.
186
 Concurrently, it is an example of the ECJ being a true judicial review 
court, keeping an eye out for any possible defects of the legislative process, being able 
to strike down the legislation which conflicts with the Treaties. 
When adopting rules, the European legislator makes a policy choice in two regards: 
firstly, it decides which areas to regulate, and secondly, it decides how it will regulate in 
those chosen areas. There are a number of legal bases in the primary law for different 
fields of Union activities and the different legal bases follow different rules and 
procedures. One of these legal bases is Article 114 which allows for harmonisation in 
the area of the internal market.
187
 
In the 1990s, the European legislator decided to regulate the marketing of tobacco 
products through the Article 114 harmonisation procedure. The directive in question
188
 
prohibited “all forms of advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products” and “any free 
distribution having the purpose or the effect of promoting such products.”
189
 The strict 
regulation was not quite appealing to Germany which thus brought an action for 
annulment of this directive. The applicant’s main claim was the wrong choice of legal 
basis: the directive clearly intended to protect public health, not to pursue internal 
market objectives, therefore Article 114 was not applicable and the measure should 
have been adopted pursuant to Article 168 TFEU.
190
 Long story short, the Court 
followed the argumentation of Germany and ruled that “a measure such as the directive 
cannot be adopted on the basis of [Article 114 TFEU].”
191
 This makes the Tobacco 
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ruling a landmark case, since it is the first time that the Court annulled an act of another 
Union institution for the reason of its ultra vires action. 
But there is more to this story. The Court not only annulled the Tobacco directive; it 
also offered some further advice to the legislator,
192
 stating that “a directive prohibiting 
certain forms of advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products could have been 
adopted on the basis of [Article 114] of the Treaty.”
193
 Apparently, between the lines, 
the Court was sending a message to the legislator: harmonisation in this field is not 
absolutely impossible; so, try again and if you follow the reasoning of this judgment, 
there is a chance that we will not annul the second directive. The legislator got a chance 
to rethink the directive’s objectives and to try once more. 
The Parliament and the Council followed the Court’s advice and drafted a second 
directive
194
 in accordance with the Court’s guidelines. That led to a successful end – the 
second Tobacco directive stood in the Court’s review.
195
 
3.4.2 Leaving It up to the Court: Corporate Mobility 
Pursuant to the Treaties, companies are free to ‘travel’ within the European market.
196
 
The Treaties guarantee two types of corporate mobility: the ‘primary right of 
establishment’ within which a company may be set up and managed in any MS,
197
 and 
the ‘secondary right of establishment’ which allows existing companies to set up 
agencies, branches and subsidiaries in any MS.
198
 The question of corporate mobility is 
interconnected with the problem of the applicable law: if a company is present in 
multiple MS, which law is applicable to it? This problem is partly covered by the 
‘conflict of laws’ doctrine (which uses various ‘connecting factors’ in order to 
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determine the applicable law), but partly unresolved. The delicate questions of the 
applicable law in the field of corporate mobility were thus left to the Court to decide. 
In 1986, the Court issued its first big ruling in the field: Daily Mail.
199
 Daily Mail was a 
British company wishing to move its central administration to the Netherlands for tax 
reasons but to remain governed by British law. British authorities were willing to allow 
such a transfer, but only under the condition that Daily Mail would be taxed (quite 
heavily) upon the relocation of their seat. That condition made it unattractive for Daily 
Mail to move and the company thus went to court, claiming that the British conditions 
violated its right of establishment under the Treaties. 
At the time, the ECJ refused to be activist. At the time, the MS still planned to specify 
the conditions regarding connecting factors by an international treaty which was to be 
adopted in the late 1980s.
200
 The Court therefore issued a ruling in favour of the UK, 
stating that “[…] companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of 
Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying 
national legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning.”
201
 With a 
bit of simplification, the Court established a rule that as long as a company wishes to be 
governed by the law of a certain MS, it has to accept all the conditions that the MS 
imposes on it. 
Later, the ECJ dealt with cases on the ‘secondary right of establishment’ and it was not 
afraid to be a little more ‘creative’: the rulings were much more in favour of the private 
companies and much less in favour of the MS. In Centros,
202
 a Danish couple 
established an art company in the UK in order to avoid the Danish capital 
requirements.
203
 Once the British company was established, they opened a branch in 
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Denmark and started to conduct business there. The end result was that Centros was a 
company of British law which had absolutely no business activity in the UK, since all of 
its activities were exercised in Denmark. Danish authorities claimed that this setting was 
clearly superficial and that it constituted an abuse of the right of establishment. 
Quite surprisingly, the ECJ did not agree with Denmark. In response to the abuse 
argument, it ruled that “[…] the fact that a national of a MS who wishes to set up a 
company chooses to form it in the MS whose rules of company law seem to him the least 
restrictive and to set up branches in other MS cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of 
the right of establishment.”
204
 Centros thus won the case and was free to enjoy the 
benefits of the good ‘choice’ of the applicable law. 
The Court upheld its generous case-law on the secondary right of establishment in two 
consequent cases. In Überseering,
205
 a Dutch company gradually moved its economic 
activities to Germany up to the moment where its German agenda was even larger than 
its Dutch agenda. When Überseering wanted to sue another company before a German 
court, Germany refused to recognise Überseering as a legal person, since under German 
law it was recognised neither as a foreign company (it had too much activity on the 
German territory), nor as a German company (it was not filed in the German company 
register). The ECJ did not agree with such a rule. It reminded Germany that companies 
are free to move within the Union and that “the refusal by a host MS (‘B’) to recognise 
the legal capacity of a company formed in accordance with the law of another MS (‘A’) 
in which it has its registered office […] constitutes a restriction on freedom of 
establishment.” Germany thus had to accept that Überseering was a valid legal person in 
the Netherlands and that it had the right to be recognised anywhere in the EU. 
Inspire Art
206
 was in fact very similar to Centros: it concerned a Dutch national who 
decided to start an art company in the UK but then to exercise its business activities 
back in the Netherlands. The Dutch authorities, enlightened by the Centros ruling, did 
not block the registration completely, but they imposed some additional requirements 
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on it. However, the ECJ ruled completely in favour of Inspire Art, reminding the Dutch 
authorities of its ruling in Centros and stating that “the fact that a national of a MS who 
wishes to set up a company can choose to do so in the MS the company-law rules of 
which seem to him the least restrictive and then set up branches in other MS is inherent 




In February 2004, the European legislator started the works on a 14
th
 company law 
directive which had been long desired and which would put an end to the 
unpredictability of the field.
208
 However, the directive was not adopted as the MS could 
not reach a consensus in the question of codetermination. Germany was not willing to 
give up its rules on employee participation and since Germany is a strong player, the 
negotiations came to a dead end. Frustrated by the blocked discussion, the European 
Commission discussed in December 2007 whether a legislative action in the field was 
even necessary.
209
 The Commission decided to leave the issue up to the Court, stating 
the following: “Since […] the issue of the transfer of the registered office might be 
clarified by the Court of Justice in the near future, the assessment concludes that it 
might be more appropriate to wait until the impacts of those developments can be fully 
assessed and the need and scope for any EU action better defined.”
210
 
The Court thus faced a situation where the legislator simply refused to regulate a field, 
since a political compromise in the Council was impossible. And while the legislator 
may postpone a discussion to a later moment, “the judges typically do not enjoy the 
luxury of not making a decision.”
211
 The Court was thus left with a policy choice which 
the legislator was not able to decide. 
In the Cartesio case,
212
 the main protagonist was a Hungarian society which wished to 
transfer its real seat to Italy but to keep its Hungarian status. Hungary refused such a 
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transfer and Cartesio went to court, claiming that the Hungarian authorities had 
infringed its rights under the EU provisions on corporate mobility. On the basis of facts 
the situation was very similar to Daily Mail. However, after all the corporate-mobility-
friendly rulings of the Court between 1986 and 2008, the legal public expected the 
Court to rule in favour of Cartesio, especially after AG Poiares Maduro delivered his 
opinion in the case, suggesting that the difference between the primary and the 
secondary right of establishment is of a minor importance, that both situations should be 
treated equally and that in the case of Cartesio, Hungary indeed infringed the 
company’s EU rights. However, the Court did not follow the Advocate General, it 
refused to make such a creative step in this area and it in fact refused the delegated 
legislative role: “In the absence of a uniform Community law definition of the 
companies which may enjoy the right of establishment […], the question whether 
[Article 49 TFEU] applies […] is a preliminary matter which, as Community law now 
stands, can only be resolved by the applicable national law.”
213
 Cartesio thus lost its 
case and the situation in the field of corporate mobility got even more complicated than 
before the ruling. After Cartesio, there have been so far two cases which offered some 
further guidance.
214
 However, the field of corporate mobility remains very 
unpredictable, offering answers only on a case-by-case basis.  
In February 2012 the legislator reopened the debate which was closed in December 
2007. The Commission launched a new questionnaire on the future of European 
company law.
215
 The Parliament backed up the project of the new company law 
directive and issued a resolution with recommendations to Commission.
216
 What will 
happen next is of course unpredictable, it is up to the legislative process and political 
debate to decide the future of corporate mobility in the EU.  
3.4.3 A Secret Message to the Treaty Drafters: The Jégo-Quéré Case 
The case of Jégo-Quéré was one of the cases concerning the admissibility of an action 
for annulment brought by an individual. The action for annulment pursuant to Article 
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263 TFEU is available primarily to so-called privileged applicants, i.e. the MS and the 
Union institutions
217
 which can ask the Court to review the legality of a legislative or 
non-legislative act.
 
Natural and legal persons may also file an action for annulment, but 
the standing of individuals is much more limited. As the Court is not meant to exercise 
judicial review on the initiative of any individual within the Union, the Treaties limit the 
standing of individuals to those acts which are of direct and individual concern to 
them.
218
 That means, for example, that an undertaking may bring an action for 
annulment of a Commission decision according to which that undertaking is fined for 
participation in a cartel in breach of Article 101 TFEU. However, acts addressed to 
individuals are apparently not the only acts which may be challenged under Article 
263(4) TFEU. 
In the famous Plaumann
219
 case of 1963, the ECJ stated that an individual applicant is 
individually concerned within the meaning of Article 263(4) TFEU in case that the 
contested measure “affect[s] their position by reason of certain attributes peculiar to 
them, or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other 
persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee.”
220
 This 
understanding of ‘individual concern’ was applied by the Court for almost four decades, 
even though it was often criticised for being too restrictive, making the level of 
protection of individuals too narrow. In 2002, the General Court (at the time the Court 
of First Instance) decided to change the scope of protection and introduce a new 
definition of ‘individual concern’, even though “whether or not the degree of judicial 
protection provided by Article 230(4) is sufficient, is first of all a political question.”
221
 
The case of Jégo-Quéré
222
 concerned a French fishing company who asked the Court to 
review the legality of a Commission Regulation on the size of fishing nets. Obviously, 
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the Regulation was an act of general application, not an act addressed to Jégo-Quéré. 
Still, the company felt directly and individually concerned by the measure, since the 
new rules significantly limited much of its fishing activities and thus had “a 
significantly adverse effect on its business.”
223
 Direct concern was fulfilled quite easily, 
since it met the requirement of the older case law to: “directly affect the legal situation 
of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure who are 
entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely 
automatic.”
224
 Individual concern, however, was much more difficult to establish, since 
the Plaumann conditions were not fulfilled. 
The General Court, however, decided not to abide by the rule formulated in Plaumann, 
stating that “the strict interpretation, applied until now, of the notion of a person 
individually concerned according to the fourth paragraph of [Article 263 TFEU], must 
be reconsidered.”
225
 In the following paragraph the EGC suggested the new definition 
of ‘individual concern’: “a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually 
concerned […] if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which 
is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on 
him.”
226
 Thus, the applicant no longer needed to be ‘unique’ and to belong to a closed 
group of persons, as required by Plaumann; now it sufficed to be definitely and 
immediately affected. The EGC even explicitly reversed Plaumann by stating that 
“[t]he number and position of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, 
or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.”
227
 
What was the answer of the ECJ to such a revolution? The ECJ did not even wait for the 
appeal in the Jégo-Quéré case; it used another pending case to respond to the EGC’s 
innovatory idea. In UPA II,
228
 another case regarding the standing of individuals, the 
ECJ refused to adopt the new definition of ‘individual concern’; instead, it applied the 
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good old Plaumann doctrine, absolutely ignoring the EGC’s judgment in Jégo-Quéré I. 
Quite predictably, two years later in Jégo-Quéré II,
229
 the ECJ confirmed its ruling in 
UPA II and set aside the judgment of the EGC in Jégo-Quéré I. 
As to the institutional dimension of these cases, they could be a nice illustration of the 
relationships between the two instances of the European judiciary; that is however not 
the reason why they are included in the chapter on institutional balance. In fact, there is 
much more to this story, which I only realised after hearing two contradictory 
interpretations of this line of case-law by two of my KU Leuven professors. 
Professor Devroe described the situation as the moment of a huge shame for the EGC: 
when it suggested a revolutionary turn in the case-law, it was (quite drastically!) 
overruled by the ECJ. The ECJ did not even bother to explain the reasons why the new 
definition of ‘individual concern’ could not be accepted. It simply ignored the ruling, as 
if it was absolutely obvious that the proposed definition was simply wrong. 
Another of my professors was Judge Lenaerts, one of the EGC judges sitting in the 
Jégo-Quéré case. In contrast to Professor Devroe, he argued that Jégo-Quéré was 
actually one of the brightest moments for the EGC, since the EGC addressed the 
judgment neither to the parties, nor to the ECJ, but rather directly to the Treaty drafters. 
At the moment, the new Constitutional Treaty was being prepared and the EGC wanted 
the Treaty drafters to realise that the interpretation of ‘individual concern’ needed to be 
reconsidered. 
Obviously, the intention of the EGC was successful. Even though the Treaty drafters did 
not adopt the new definition for all the acts, they created a new regime for the so-called 
‘regulatory acts’.
230
 A new sentence was added to Article 263(4) TFEU according to 
which ‘regulatory acts’ only need to concern the applicant directly; individual concern 
is not required. The success of the ECJ’s suggestion is thus partial. 
                                                          
 
229
 ECJ, Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-03425. 
230
 ‘Regulatory acts’ have been defined by the EGC as “all acts of general application apart from 
legislative acts.” See EGC, Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v EP and Council, 
Judgment of 6 September 2011, not yet reported, para 56; and EGC, Case T-262/10 Microban v 
Commission, Judgment of 25 October 2011, not yet reported, para 21. However, appeals from both these 
cases are currently pending before the ECJ, so the definition might still be altered. 
 55   
3.4.5 Conclusion: Politically Influential? (towards Union institutions) 
The goal of analysing these selected cases is that the Court is sometimes invited into the 
political process of the European legislator, either through procedures of judicial review 
(Tobacco Saga), by an explicit legislator’s delegation (corporate mobility) or by its own 
decision (Jégo-Quéré). This undoubtedly makes the Court political, or rather ‘politically 
influential’ on the level of inter-institutional dialogue in the EU. 
As a ‘judicial review court’, the ECJ cannot avoid being political. By definition, once a 
court is empowered with judicial review, it unavoidably touches highly political 
questions, as it supervises the legislative process and thus intervenes with the activity of 
political bodies when deciding whether the legislator has crossed a certain line or not. In 
fact, judicial review by constitutional courts may even be labelled as “the most obvious 
and spectacular type of judicial politics.”
231
 
3.5 Impact in the Member States 
“European law, judge-made and legislative, is now cutting deeply  
into the substance of the socio-economic regimes of Social Market economies.” 
– Fritz Scharpf 
232
 
The law and politics of the EU have gradually become an inseparable component of the 
law and politics of the MS. Private and public parties solve their disputes not only on 
the national level, but they also include EU law in their strategies. The European legal 
system is thus capable of “shifting the domestic balances of power.”
233
 
In this chapter, three models of EU judicial intervention into MS national politics are 
analysed. The first example demonstrates how private litigants (and interest groups) 
may use EU litigation to fight for their interests. The second example shows how the 
case-law of the ECJ in the field of EU citizenship influences the law-making on the 
national level. The third example is an analysis of a recent opinion by AG Bot regarding 
a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia which has been brought to the EU level. 
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3.5.1 British Discrimination Case 
In the past three decades, the advocates of gender equality in the United Kingdom have 
faced many challenges and lost many battles on the national political level. However, 
the European legal system has “transformed previously weak organisations with little 
leverage into political players capable of directly influencing national policy.”
234
 In her 
analysis of this shift of power, Karen Alter points out that the potential success of a 
European litigation strategy is dependent on four conditions: (1) a right guaranteed in 
the EU legal system, (2) a litigant who is willing to undergo the timely and financial 
constraints of fighting for such right, (3) a national court willing to make a reference for 
to the ECJ, and (4) the acceptance of the ECJ’s ruling by national actors.
235
 Let us now 
look at the fight for gender equality in Britain in the four respective steps. 
The first condition of success is an existence of an EU right. Discrimination has been a 
matter of concern of the EU legal system from the very beginning: already the Treaty of 
Rome included a provision in Article 119 which guaranteed equal pay for equal work to 
men and women.
236
 The European legislator has also adopted several anti-
discrimination directives, among others the Equal Pay Directive
237
 and the Equal 
Treatment Directive.
238





 that Article 119 and the Equal Treatment Directive respectively are capable 
of direct effect in the national legal systems. The EU legal order thus guaranteed an 
enforceable right to individuals and the first step to success was thus fulfilled. 
The second condition is the existence of a plaintiff, since the mere existence of an EU 
right would mean nothing without a litigant willing to claim this right. The battle 
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against discrimination is often fought by various organisations which offer assistance to 
the victims. These organisations are, however, not legitimated to go to courts and fight 
for a better world themselves; they need the real victims of discrimination to become 
plaintiffs. In the case of Defrenne for example, it took five years to find a person who 
would be willing to undergo the litigation process.
241
 The main reason for the victims’ 
unwillingness to litigate is probably the length of the proceedings, especially if the full 
procedure includes several instances of domestic courts and litigation in Luxembourg. 
Once the first two conditions are fulfilled, the litigation may begin. The EU judicial 
system relies on national courts: it is up to them to apply EU law to individual situations 
or to refer a question on interpretation to the ECJ. Without cooperative national courts, 
the ECJ would never be able to create such a strong body of EU law and private 
litigants would never be able to claim their EU rights in national courts. In the UK, 
“national judicial support came from an unlikely source: the industrial tribunals, which 
are the lowest rung of the judicial hierarchy.”
242
 Since they were willing to make 
references to the ECJ, the third condition was fulfilled and the path of private litigants 
to Luxembourg was open. In the area of discrimination the ECJ has ruled in favour of 
the private litigants several times: extending work benefits for part-time workers, 
equalising pension benefits for men and women, removing the limit on the amount of 
discrimination awards, or protecting pregnant women who were unfairly dismissed.
243
 
These rulings are not political per se; they may however be of a political importance 
back in the MS, if the fourth condition is fulfilled: the follow-up. 




 jurisprudence, the MS may not afford to 
ignore a ruling of the ECJ,
246
 since individuals would then be entitled to bring a 
damages action against the state (even against its judicial bodies). Threatened by such 
scenarios, the British legislator gave up and adopted a more favourable legislation 
scheme in the field of discrimination. This way, “activists have translated legal 
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victories into social policy changes with real impacts on the conduct of employers and 
the government.”
247
 The ECJ’s ruling thus had a visible effect on the political processes 
in Britain and supposedly also in other MS. 
3.5.2 Belgian and Irish Citizenship Cases 
Ruiz Zambrano
248
 is undoubtedly one of the most controversial ECJ cases of the past 
decade. The Court ruled in 2011 that a family of two illegal Columbian immigrants and 
their three children was entitled to reside in Belgium, since two of the children, Jessica 
and Diego, had acquired Belgian nationality simply by being born in Belgium. Despite 
all the previous ECJ’s jurisprudence on Union citizenship which required ‘activation’ of 
citizenship by moving to another MS,
249
 the Zambrano family was allowed to stay on 
the Belgian territory even though they had never moved outside of Belgium.
250
 
Union citizenship is a field of EU law where the Treaties say very little and the case-law 
says very much. The Court’s jurisprudence has been quite dynamic in the past two 
decades and its impact on national laws has been significant.
251
 Ireland has changed its 
nationality legislation in 2004
252
, Belgium has already changed its immigration laws 
twice, both times in connection to the case of Ruiz Zambrano. Why is it that the MS 
react to the Court’s jurisprudence by changing their legislation? 
According to the Court’s case law in the field of Union citizenship, the conditions of 
acquiring national citizenship are crucial. In the Micheletti case,
253
 an Argentinian 
dentist came to visit Europe and since one of his grandparents was Italian, he could 
claim Italian citizenship. When he wanted to start a business in Spain, the Spanish 
authorities treated him as an Argentinian and refused to recognise his rights under the 
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freedom of establishment. The Court however ruled that if Italy had granted him Italian 
citizenship, all the other MS were obliged to unconditionally treat him as an EU citizen. 
The Zhu and Chen case
254
 was decided very similarly to the Micheletti judgment. The 
Chen family came to Europe to have their second child, since they could not have two 
children in China, their country of origin. Mrs Chen went to Belfast to give birth to her 
daughter Catherine, and since Irish citizenship rules were very generous, Catherine 
became an Irish national. The Chen family then returned to London and claimed a right 
of residence on the grounds of Catherine’s Irish nationality. British authorities refused 
this but the ECJ ruled that if Ireland had decided to grant Catherine Irish nationality, the 
authorities of all the other MS must respect her status as a Union citizen. 
The MS soon understood the basic rule: if the legislature of one MS is too benevolent in 
accepting third country nationals as their own, such a MS not only grants the 
immigrants the national citizenship, but also the EU citizenship, since “[e]very person 
holding the nationality of a MS shall be a citizen of the Union.”
255
 The MS who granted 
citizenship to foreigners too easily soon started to play the role of the ‘open gate’ for 
immigrants. For this reason, countries like Ireland and Belgium have already made 
changes to their nationality and immigrant law and “it can be expected that other MS 
too will follow suit and restrict their nationality legislation”
256
 in response to the ECJ’s 
case-law. It is thus obvious that the rulings of the ECJ have clearly had an impact on the 
legislative (and thus political) debate in the MS. 
3.5.3 The ECJ as an Arbiter of Member States’ Disputes? 
The ECJ has recently become a forum of a political dispute between two MS: Hungary 
and Slovakia. On 21 August 2009, László Sólyom, at the time the President of Hungary, 
decided to visit Slovak territory in order to attend a ceremony where a statute of Saint 
Stephen was to be inaugurated. The date of the event was ‘particularly sensitive’ for 
Slovakia, as it was an anniversary of the Hungarian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Since Slovak political elites evaluated Sólyom’s visit as highly inappropriate and 
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potentially dangerous, they entered into a diplomatic dialogue with Hungary. President 
Sólyom however tried to pursue his visit anyway. While walking on a bridge between 
the two countries, he received a diplomatic note that his entry to Slovak territory was 
prohibited and therefore he turned around at the border and walked back to Hungary.
257
 
On 8 July 2010 Hungary brought an infringement action against Slovakia under Article 
259 TFEU,
258
 claiming that Slovakia had violated Mr Sólyom’s citizenship rights under 
Article 21(1) TFEU and the Citizenship Directive.
259
 The Union judiciary was thus 
directly pulled into an inter-state political conflict 
Advocate General Bot issued an opinion in March 2012.
260
 He first confirms the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to rule on this action, “inasmuch as the dispute between 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic is indeed based on an alleged infringement of EU 
law.”
261
 However, he points out the difference between a private visit and a visit that is 
‘public in nature’. And since “it was indeed in the performance of his duties as the 
President of Hungary, and not simply as a citizen of the Union,”
262
 President Sólyom 
could not enjoy his Union citizenship rights in this setting. 
Interestingly enough, AG Bot reasons his opinion on the basis of the provisions on the 
division of competences between the Union and the MS.
263
 Since visits of MS’ Heads of 
State have not been conferred upon the Union, this dispute is outside the scope of EU 
law and it remains to be resolved by the MS themselves in the light of international law 
customs and conventions.
264
 The AG thus refuses to interfere with the political conflict 
between the two MS, concluding that “visits by Heads of State within the MS of the 
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However, AG Bot suggests that the EU is not completely excluded from political 
disputes between the MS. Should the MS “exercise their diplomatic competence in a 
manner that might lead to a lasting break in diplomatic relations,” such a “situation of 
persistent paralysis […] would be covered by EU law,” namely by the principle of loyal 
cooperation embodied in Article 4(3) TEU.
266
 The AG, covering himself with the 
preamble to the EU Treaty speaking of ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’, is basically saying: children, be nice to each other and do not steal each 
other’s toys; if you don’t obey now, we’ll interfere later… 
3.5.4 Conclusion: Politically Influential? (towards the Member States) 
The three areas of case-law analysed in this subchapter show that the ECJ may have a 
significant influence on the political situation in the MS. In relation to preliminary 
references, Rasmussen remarks that “[t]he Court achieved a possibility to reach 
national audience of decision-makers free from usual governmental political jargon.”
267
 
Indeed, the British discrimination case illustrated how the EU judicial system makes it 
possible for private litigants and interest groups to change national legislation. 
The second case-study was meant to show another way of the ECJ’s influence in 
national politics: it is not only through EU legislation, but also through the ECJ’s case-
law that the Union ‘forces’ the MS to amend their laws.  
The last example, very recent and very sensitive, targeted the core of ‘the political’: the 
diplomatic relations between two MS and the Union’s role in such a conflict. Clearly, 
the Court does not wish to interfere with the MS’ political disputes; still, it cannot stay 
completely out of them, since the EU is a political project based on a political 
cooperation and disputes arising out of it could fall into the jurisdiction of the Court as 
long as they fall into the scope of EU law. 
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Conclusion 
“Judges make low visibility decisions engendered by their duty to resolve conflicts. 
These decisions involve very small immediate impacts but create major long-term 
policies in the form of doctrines presented as the product of non-partisan reason 
and expressed in technical, expert language. Moreover this language 
constantly stresses stability and predictability so that attacks on judicial policies 




The question whether the ECJ is a political actor is not a simple yes/no question. At 
least not until the notion of ‘political’ is duly defined and the question clarified. This 
thesis was meant to offer a synthesis of the various definitions of ‘political’, and to 
analyse the European judiciary in the context of those definitions. 
Both the US Supreme Court and the ECJ have been labelled as political actors, even 
though their composition and functioning differ to a great extent. In the US, the 
‘political’ character of the Supreme Court is often based on two issues: (1) the 
appointment process by the Senate, and (2) the judgments rendered by the Court in the 
fields of ‘mega-politics’ (Hirschl), such as constitutional review, racial segregation, 
separation of church and state, free speech, censorship, pornography, the right to 
abortion, health insurance and many others. 
The European context is quite different. This thesis tried to examine five possible 
contexts in which the European judiciary could be labelled as political. However, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are as many definitions of political as there are authors 
who write about politics. For this reason, it is much more convenient to examine 
whether the ECJ is (1) politically motivated as far as its individual judges are 
concerned, (2) politically influenced as far as the appointment of judges is concerned, 
(3) politically creative in its case-law, (4) politically influential towards other Union 
institutions, and (5) politically influential in relation to the Member States. 
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While the first two dimensions in fact overlap with the problem of the ‘politicisation of 
the judiciary’, the third, fourth and fifth dimension are linked with the notion of the 
‘judicialisation of politics’. 
On the basis of the analyses provided above, it seems that the ECJ is both politically 
creative and politically influential. It has decided landmark cases, constitutionalised the 
Treaties, created legal principles only on the basis of the ‘spirit of the Treaty’, filled in 
for the other political institutions in situations of legislative inaction; and its case-law 
has undoubtedly had impact both in the inter-institutional dialogue within the Union and 
in the political discussions on the national level. This definitely fulfils the definitions of 
politics by Tocqueville, Tomsa, or Easton. Looking at such a court, one is tempted to 
accept the supranational idea of the Court being incredibly strong and independent. 
At the same-time, the Court has managed to cover its politically creative decision-
making behind a veil of legal arguments, as suggested by the neo-functionalists whose 
claim is in fact close to the attitude of Critical Legal Studies. The interlocutors, such as 
private litigants in the British discrimination cases, have therefore been able to pursue 
their political goals and even to achieve legislation changes, through EU litigation. 
Such a Court fits well within the definition of ‘judicialisation of politics’. However, as 
stressed by Judge Kühn: that is not wrong in itself, since a certain degree of judicial 
activism is nowadays common to all european judiciaries. It is only important to realise 
that a politically powerful court needs to put even more emphasis on the independence 
of its members. Reversing the formulation of Carl Schmitt, we could claim that today 
the ‘politicisation of the judiciary’ would be much worse, especially in the context of 
the current degree of ‘judicialisation of politics’. 
Yes, the ECJ is a political actor: in certain meanings of the word, at certain moments 
and depending on certain criteria. Yet, it remains a rational actor, since it realises that it 
still depends on the MS’ acceptance. Not in the sense claimed by the 
intergovernmentalists, since the weakness of their theory may be seen all the way back 
to the Van Gend ruling where the Court clearly went against the interests expressed by 
the MS governments. However, it is the national constitutional courts that play the role 
of a guardian of the ECJ: through the preliminary ruling mechanism and through an 
inter-institutional dialogue, they show the ECJ how far they are willing to let it go. 
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As suggested above, the role of the ECJ cannot be understood by only studying its legal 
dimension. The analyses offered by political science, but also by other social sciences, 
may be extremely helpful in studying the Court.  
For the future, it might be very interesting to observe the Court’s adjudication in the 
context of the current economic crisis and of a changing atmosphere in various parts of 
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Abstract in Czech 
I. Úvod 
V roce 2009 se ve Spojených státech amerických hledal nástupce na uprázdněné místo soudce 
Nejvyššího soudu USA.
1
 Kandidátkou byla soudkyně hispánského původu, Sonia Sotomayor, 
která byla známou aktivistkou za práva hispánských žen. Na základě některých svých projevů 
byla soudkyně Sotomayor dokonce označena za rasistku.
2
 Její nominace vyvolala bouřlivou 
diskusi nejen v politických kruzích, ale také mezi širokou veřejností. 
V roce 2010 se na Soudním dvoře EU uprázdnily tři soudcovská místa, dvě na Soudním dvoře a 
jedno na Tribunálu.
3
 Členské státy nominovaly své kandidáty a výběru soudců se poprvé 
v historii EU účastnil i nově zřízený Výbor podle článku 255, který má podle Smluv za úkol 
vydávat „stanovisko k vhodnosti kandidátů na funkce soudce a generálního advokáta Soudního 
dvora a Tribunálu.“
4
 Výbor nejdříve schválil nizozemskou kandidátku (československého 
původu) Alexandru Prechal, a to s výslovným doporučením,
5
 u dalších kandidátů byl však 
průběh nominace o něco složitější. Poté, co se Výbor vyjádřil k nominacím, ze seznamu 
kandidátů zmizela dvě jména: maďarský soudce Czúcz a řecký kandidát Vassilopoulos.
6
 Stalo 
se tak bez formálního rozhodnutí, bez jakéhokoliv odůvodnění a bez veřejné diskuse. 
Kontrast mezi uvedenými dvěma příklady je zřejmý: zatím co v USA je veřejná debata o 
soudcovských nominacích samozřejmostí, v EU se výběr soudců děje in camera, dokumenty 
jsou buď nicneříkající, nebo vůbec neexistují a občané se dozvědí až finální rozhodnutí. 
V USA má každý student práv svého oblíbeného soudce Nejvyššího soudu, v EU by průměrný 
student pravděpodobně nevyjmenoval více než dva soudce Evropského soudního dvora. 
Američtí soudci jsou slavné osobnosti, mají své soudcovské styly a jejich postoje jsou veřejně 
známé; soudci Evropského soudního dvora jsou jen členy soudcovského kolektivu, který 
rozhoduje kolegiálně, a tedy anonymně. Když někoho v USA zajímají alternativní názory 
k tomu či onomu soudnímu rozhodnutí, může si přečíst odlišná stanoviska soudců a získat 
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představu, o čem se mezi soudci diskutovalo. Rozsudky Evropského soudního dvora pojem 
disentu neznají a soudcovské diskuse v rámci senátů jsou tajné. 
Z těchto několika příkladů je vidět, jak odlišné jsou nejvyšší soudní instance v USA a v EU. 
Oba tyto systémy jsou však často obviňovány ze soudcovského aktivismu, z politizace justice či 
judicializace politiky, zkrátka z toho, že jsou politické. Média i akademici z řad právníků a 
politologů se často věnují politickému rozměru Nejvyššího soudu či Evropského soudního 
dvora, málokdy však definují základní pojmy své analýzy. Tato práce si neklade za úkol srovnat 
americký a evropský model soudnictví. Cílem je vyjasnit si pojem politiky a politického 
soudního rozhodování a následně v evropském kontextu analyzovat relevanci obvinění 
směřujících k politickému charakteru ESD. 
II. Evropský soudní dvůr jako instituce 
Předmětem výzkumu této práce je Evropský soudní dvůr (ESD). Jedná se o jeden ze 
soudů Evropské Unie, který spolu s Tribunálem a Soudem pro veřejnou službu 
„zajišťuje dodržování práva při výkladu a provádění Smluv.“
7
 Tato vágně vymezená 
pravomoc byla Soudním dvorem již mnohokrát použita k legitimizaci kontroverzních 
rozsudků s dalekosáhlými dopady, o čemž pojednává i jedna z  kapitol.
8
 
II. 1 Složení a fungování ESD 
Soudní dvůr má 35 členů: 27 soudců (jeden z každého členského státu)
9
 a 8 generálních 
advokátů (5 stálých a 3 rotující).
10
 Kandidáty nominují členské státy „z osob, které 
poskytují veškeré záruky nezávislosti a které splňují požadavky článků 253 a 254,“ 
jmenováni jsou pak „vzájemnou dohodou vlád členských států na dobu šesti let.“
11
  
Evropské soudní instituce se zabývají rozličnými druhy podání, mezi nejobvyklejší patří 
řízení o předběžné otázce podle článku 267 SFEU, žaloba pro porušení smlouvy podle 
článku 258 SFEU, žaloba na neplatnost podle článku 263 SFEU, žaloba na nečinnost 
podle článku 265 SFEU či žaloba o náhradu škody podle článku 268 SFEU. 
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II. 2 Lze ESD označit za ústavní soud? 
V posledních letech byl Ústavní soud ČR již několikrát kritizován za přílišný 
aktivismus, mimo jiné i prezidentem Václavem Klausem, který prohlásil, „že Ústavní 
soud se pohybuje mimo ústavu a že vstoupil do čisté politiky.“
12
 Předseda Ústavního 
soudu Pavel Rychetský na toto obvinění prezidenta republiky reagoval slovy: „Někdo 
může těžko chtít, aby Ústavní soud nebyl politický orgán, když jeho hlavní, základní 
funkcí je právě hlídat politický orgán.“
13
 Bývalá místopředsedkyně Ústavního soudu 
v Českém rozhlasu potvrdila výrok Pavla Rychetského a dodala: „…a nejen to – mohu 
potvrdit, že tento názor naprosto převládá zcela jednoznačně v evropské ústavněprávní 
vědě, v politologii, prostě tak to je. Ústavní soudy mají jako předmět své činnosti 
politikum, tudíž samozřejmě s politikem se zabývají.“
14
 
Někteří autoři (např. Karen Alter),
15
 obhajují názor, že ESD má přes svá specifika 
charakter mezinárodního soudu. Jiní (např. Eric Stein
16
 a Joseph Weiler
17
) tvrdí, že ESD 
svou činností proměnil Smlouvy v ústavní dokument a sám sebe postavil do role 
ústavního soudu. Koen Lenaerts uvádí, že Soudní dvůr EU jedná ve třech rolích 




Tato práce vychází z pozice, že ESD je ústavním soudem, a to zejména ze dvou důvodu. 
Za prvé, ESD disponuje právem kontroly souladu evropské legislativy se Smlouvami, 
což připomíná přezkum ústavnosti. Za druhé, ESD má pravomoc interpretovat předpisy 
primárního práva EU, což v mnoha případech dělá i nad rámec jejich textu a tím se 
stává nejen jejich interpretem, ale také tvůrcem,
19
 což je fenomén typický pro silnější 
ústavní soudy ve 21. století. 
                                                          
 
12
 (iDnes.cz, 2011): Klaus: Verdiktem o stavebním spoření Ústavní soud vstoupil do politiky 
13
 (iDnes.cz, 2011): Klaus nechápe roli Ústavního soudu, míní Rychetský 
14
 (Wagnerová, 2012) 
15
 (Alter, 2009), str. 32 
16
 (Stein, 1981), str. 1 
17
 (Weiler, 1982), str. 274 
18
 (Lenaerts, 1991), str. 32 a násl. 
19
 (Stone Sweet, 2000), str. 135 
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II. 3 Pohled na soud ve dvojím kontextu 
Nelze než souhlasit s Bohumilem Baxou, který tvrdí: „Chtíti určitou instituci právní 
(státní) posuzovati jen z hlediska jejího významu právního bez náležitého zřetele na její 
význam politický, znamenalo by nejen posuzovati ji jednostranně, nýbrž i ztratiti s očí 
právě onen (dynamický) moment vývojový, který z mnohé instituce juristicky 
veledůležité činí instituci politicky bezvýznamnou neb dokonce i přežitou.“
20
 Platí to i 
v evropském kontextu, kde ustanovení Smluv často obsahují jen velice rámcové 
informace, zatímco opravdový charakter jednotlivých institucí lze poznat až studiem 
jejich interakce s ostatními aktéry. 
Andreas Grimmel správně podotýká, že mezioborová spolupráce je základem 
porozumění tomu, jak právo ovlivňuje proces evropské integrace.
21
 Tato práce se proto 
zabývá jak právním, tak i politickým kontextem Evropského soudního dvora a klade si 
otázku: nakolik jsou opodstatněná tvrzení, která označují ESD za politického aktéra? 
III. Politika, politizace justice a judicializace politiky 
Pojem politiky je u různých autorů různý, čím dál tím víc se také objevují pojmy 
politizace justice, judicializace politiky či soudcovský aktivismus. Tyto pojmy jsou často 
používány s negativní konotací ke kritice rostoucí moci soudů a jejich provázanosti 
s politickými aktéry. V této práci však pojem politiky nemá apriorně negativní kontext.  
Andrew Heywood vymezuje politiku několika způsoby, v nejširším smyslu například 
jako proces řešení sporů, vykonávání moci či dialog.
22
 Jestli soudnictví označíme za 
politické v jednom z těchto kontextů, nejedná se o kritiku, nýbrž o popis jeho 
společenské funkce autoritativního řešitele sporů, o které není pochyb. 
Mnozí autoři vykládají pojem politického soudního rozhodování v kontrastu k pojmu 
prosté aplikace práva, resp. jako vymezení role moci soudní vůči roli zákonodárce. 
Alexis Tocqueville považuje za nezbytné, aby se soudce neodchyloval od konkrétního 
případu, který řeší, jinak by totiž překročil meze své funkce a zasahoval by do moci 
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 citováno podle (Kysela, 2011), str. 181 
21
 (Grimmel, 2011), str. 22 
22
 (Heywood, 2007), str. 3-7 
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legislativce.
23
 Bohuš Tomsa rozlišuje mezi adjudikací, tj. subsumpcí faktického stavu 
pod předem danou normu, a právní politikou, tj. vytvářením práva na základě právních 
principů.
24
 Radoslav Procházka uvádí, že zatímco zákonodárce má právo na základě 
hodnotových soudů rozhodovat o tom, co považuje za dobré a špatné, úkolem soudce je 
jen určovat (v mezích vymezených zákonodárcem) co je správné či nesprávné.
25
 David 




Co se týče pojmů politizace justice a judicializace politiky, jejich význam se často 
zaměňuje. Důvodem je možná jejich historický vývoj, kdy jejich původní chápání již 
nezodpovídá tomu, jak jsou tyto pojmy používány dnes. 
Carl Schmitt například chápal politizaci justice jako stav, ve kterém soudy rozhodují 
politické otázky, a judicializace politiky jako situaci opačnou, ve které byly otázky 
právní interpretace svěřeny politickým institucím. Na příkladu říšské ústavy Schmitt 
uvádí, že její interpretace by měla být svěřena raději demokraticky legitimovanému 




Dnes se tyto pojmy chápou odlišně (i když ne zcela konzistentně). Ran Hirschl definuje 
judicializaci politiky jako důvěru v soudy a v soudní řešení morálních otázek, otázek 
veřejného pořádku či politických kontroverzí.
28
 Tento fenomén má původ v době, kdy 
se soudy začaly zabývat otázkami lidských práv, postupně však prorostl i do otázek 
„mega-politických“, které Hirschl definuje jako záležitosti nejvyšší politické důležitosti, 
které často rozdělují společnost.
29
 
Zdeněk Kühn ztotožňuje pojem judicializace politiky s pojmem soudcovského aktivismu 
a upozorňuje na dvě možná chápání tohoto pojmu. Soudcovský aktivismus stricto sensu 
zahrnuje „rozhodování soudů, které vykládají a spoluvytváří vysoce neurčité právní 
                                                          
 
23
 (Tocqueville, 1841), str. 142-144 
24
 (Tomsa, 1946), str. 71 a násl., citováno v (Kysela, 2012) 
25
 (Procházka, 2006) 
26
 srovnej výklad v (Neubauer, et al., 2012), str. 9. 
27
 (Schmitt, 1993), str. 118-119, citováno v (Kühn, 2010). 
28
 (Hirschl, 2008), str. 2 
29
 (Hirschl, 2008), str. 1-2 
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principy nebo normy, event. řeší normativní konflikty s ohledem na fikci bezrozpornosti 
právního systému.“
30
 Soudcovský aktivismus largo sensu zahrnuje také „rozhodování 
soudů v situacích, kdy jejich rozhodnutí […] bude mít dalekosáhlý dopad na politiku.“
31
 
Soudcovský aktivismus v obou těchto formách je podle Kühna „nezbytnou součástí 
současné evropské justice, a současně vyvolává dodatečný apel na skutečnou 
nezávislost justice.“
32
 Jinými slovy, čím političtější je agenda soudů, tím více nezávislí 
by měli být soudci samotní. 
Pojem politizace justice se zaměřuje zejména na vliv politiky na soudce a soudnictví
33
 a 
lze pod něj zařadit například otázky jmenování soudců, financování justice, politických 
procesů či politických vlivů na rozhodování soudců. 
Tato práce se pokouší zapracovat výše vymezené pojmy do kontextu evropského 
soudnictví. Její stěžejní kapitola, věnovaná politickému kontextu ESD, je rozdělená do 
pěti víceméně samostatných kapitol. 
První dvě kapitoly se věnují otázkám, které by bylo možno zařadit pod pojem politizace 
justice. Kapitola 1 zkoumá osobnosti soudců a důvody stojící za jejich rozhodnutími. 
Klade si otázku, zda je možné, aby bylo evropské soudnictví politizováno v rovině 
rozhodování soudců. Kapitola 2 se zaměřuje na jmenování soudců ESD a zkoumá, zda 
v tomto procesu můžou hrát roli politické důvody, ať již ze strany členských států či ze 
strany Unie. 
Poslední tři kapitoly zkoumají samotnou rozhodovací činnost evropských soudů a řeší, 
nakolik dochází v evropském soudnictví k fenoménu judicializace politiky. Kapitola 3 
se věnuje klíčovým judikátům ESD, které se staly základem právního řádu EU, jak jej 
známe dnes, a nastoluje otázku jejich legitimity. Kapitola 4 zkoumá institucionální 
rovnováhu mezi mocí soudní a zákonodárnou na evropské úrovni, resp. schopnost 
evropských soudů zasahovat do legislativní činnosti ostatních politických aktérů v EU. 
Kapitola 5 je nakonec věnována vlivu judikatury ESD na politická rozhodnutí 
v členských státech. 
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 (Kühn, 2006), kapitola II. 
31
 (Kühn, 2006), kapitola II. 
32
 (Kühn, 2006), kapitola II. 
33
 srovnej např. (Trochtová, 2010), str. 7 
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IV. Evropský soudní dvůr jako politický aktér 
IV. 1 Osobnosti soudců ESD 
Soudní interpretace a aplikace práva je velmi důležitým tématem právní teorie i praxe. 
Soudci mají pro svá rozhodnutí často důvody právní i neprávní, obzvláště pak na úrovni 
ústavních soudů či ESD. Tato kapitola si klade otázku, nakolik je možné, že soudci 
v Lucemburku rozhodují na základě svého politického přesvědčení, resp. jestli justice 
v EU skýtá nějaké záruky, které by měly politická rozhodnutí eliminovat. 
Důvody rozhodnutí by často měly být patrné z odůvodnění, nelze však vyloučit situaci, 
kdy je odůvodnění nedostatečné, nepřesvědčivé, či nepravdivé (ve smyslu, že je sice 
smysluplné, ale reálné důvody rozhodnutí byly jiné). Hnutí Critical Legal Studies 
přistupovalo k soudním odůvodněním s apriorní nedůvěrou a s přesvědčením, že právo 
je jen zástěrkou pro politiku a právní argumenty ve skutečnosti jen zakrývají opravdové 
důvody rozhodnutí a politickou profilaci jednotlivých soudců. Soudy proto byly 
vnímány již z definice jako politické instituce a soudci jako aktéři popírající ideologické 
prvky ve vlastním soudním rozhodování a proto jednající ve zlé víře.
34
 
O něco méně radikální bylo hnutí amerického právního realismu, dle kterého je každé 
právní rozhodnutí ovlivněno neprávními důvody spočívajícími v osobnosti soudce. 
Čistě právní odůvodnění rozsudku je sice možné, nikoli však pravdivé, jelikož soudce 
nemůže rozhodovat bez toho, aby byl ovlivněn svým původem, vzděláním či 
přesvědčením. Právní realisté proto apelovali na právníky, aby četli mezi řádky 
soudních rozhodnutí, aby se nespokojili s právními důvody rozhodnutí, ale aby se 
snažili odhalit opravdovou motivaci soudců.
35
 Jan Kysela uvádí, že „bez ohledu na 
akcenty právních realistů výstižně ilustruje význam soudcovského „předporozumění“ 
letitá pobídka K. G. Wurzela, abychom nechali soudit podle svých zákonů čínské 
soudce; dočkali bychom se výsledků velmi odlišných od rozhodování soudců našich.“
36
 
Závěry amerického právního realismu se neváží jen na začátek 20. století a na americké 
právní prostředí. Eliška Wagnerová nedávno uvedla: „sociální vědy prokázaly, že určité 
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 srovnej (Kysela, 2011), str. 194; (Dyevre, 2008), str. 6-7 a (Thomas, 2005), str. 24 
35
 (Dyevre, 2008), str. 9 
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 (Kysela, 2011), str. 178 
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sociální faktory, se kterými je spojen konkrétní soudce, jej determinují do té míry, že má 
přece jenom jiný přístup k realitě a k právu než člověk, který je sociálně determinován 
nějakým způsobem jinak. Jeden prostě podporuje a tenduje víc k důrazu na sociální 
vyrovnání, druhý naopak tenduje k tomu, že podporuje neomezenou podnikatelskou 
svobodu, a tak dále. Přitom, samozřejmě, jednak jde o politické filosofie, také, které ten 
člověk zastává, ale především jde o to, jak teda vlastně z těch svých pozic, které si 
vybudoval díky své zkušenosti, díky tomu, do čeho se narodil, v čem vyrostl, v čem 
vystudoval, v čem se pohyboval, tak prostě díky takto předznamenaným pozicím jak 
reflektuje politickou a etickou dimenzi ústavního rozhodování.“
37
 
Je-li obecně přijímáno, že soudci nerozhodují jen podle práva, lze zajistit, aby se do 
soudního rozhodování nedostaly politické vlivy? Soudní soustava EU nabízí několik 
záruk soudcovské nezávislosti, které lze rozdělit do čtyř skupin. 
Zaprvé, ESD je soudní institucí, což s sebou přináší určité obecné záruky: oddělenost od 
ostatních složek moci (v případě ESD i geografická vzdálenost Brusel-Lucemburk), 
nepřítomnost zájmových skupin, finanční a společenská prestiž soudcovské funkce a 
v případě lucemburského soudu také úplná soudní samospráva a nezávislost na moci 
výkonné. 
Zadruhé, Smlouvy vyžadují, aby byli soudci a generální advokáti „vybíráni z osob, které 
poskytují veškeré záruky nezávislosti.“
38
 Toto ustanovení by mělo zaručit, aby členské 
státy nenominovaly kandidáty s velice vyhraněným politickým profilem. Posílením této 
záruky je nově zřízený Výbor podle čl. 255, o kterém bude pojednávat další kapitola. 
Každý soudce a generální advokát má navíc povinnost „před nastoupením do své funkce 
složit na veřejném zasedání před Soudním dvorem přísahu, že bude vykonávat svou 




Zatřetí, rozhodování ESD je kolektivní, přičemž jednotliví soudci nezastupují zájmy 
svých členských států, nýbrž rozhodují v zájmu integrity evropského právního 
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 (Wagnerová, 2012) 
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 srovnej čl. 19/2 SEU 
39
 srovnej čl. 2 Protokolu č. 3 o Statutu Soudního dvora Evropské unie 
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pořádku.
40
 Soudci rozhodují v senátech složených z 3, 5 nebo 13 soudců a každé 
rozhodnutí je podepsáno všemi členy senátu, bez ohledu na to, jak hlasovali. Vzhledem 
k tomu, že porady jsou tajné a že ESD nezná odlišná stanoviska, nelze zjistit (či zpětně 
ověřit), jak hlasoval ten který soudce. Výhodou tohoto systému je ochrana soudců před 
nátlakem ze strany členských států, nevýhodou je nedostatečná transparentnost činnosti 
ESD a fikce jediného správného rozhodnutí. 
Za čtvrté, Statut SDEU ukládá soudcům povinnost zdůvodnit každé rozhodnutí. Tato 
záruka je ze všech čtyř nejkontroverznější a nejvíce kritizována,
41
 jelikož styl 
odůvodnění ESD je často „kryptický“ a nedostatečný, což plyne mimo jiné i z toho, že 
každé rozhodnutí je výsledkem kompromisu minimálně tří soudců.
42
 Samotná povinnost 
odůvodňovat rozsudky je však důležitým prvkem moderní justice a není opomenuta ani 
v soudním systému EU. 
Pro shrnutí lze říct, že politizace justice v rovině promítání preferencí soudců do jejich 
rozhodování není specifickým problémem ESD, ale problémem postihujícím každou 
soudní instituci.
43
 Každý soudce má určité zázemí a hodnotové preference, které 
nemůžou neovlivňovat jeho rozhodování. Soudní systém EU nenechává prostor pro 
soudcovskou libovůli, nýbrž poskytuje určité záruky, které by měly zajistit nezávislost 
soudu i jeho soudců. 
IV. 2 Jmenování soudců ESD 
Soudci a generální advokáti SDEU jsou do svých funkcí „jmenováni vzájemnou 
dohodou vlád členských států na dobu šesti let.“
44
 Samotnému jmenování však 
předchází (minimálně) dva kroky: nominace členským státem a schválení Výborem 
podle čl. 255. 
Evropská unie v zásadě neklade na kandidáty nominované členskými státy žádné jiné 
nároky než výše zmiňovanou nezávislost a „požadavky nezbytné k výkonu nejvyšších 
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 srovnej čl. 19/1 SEU 
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 viz např. (Bobek, 2008), str. 1639-1640, (Lasser, 2003), str. 49 či (Weiler, 2001), str. 225 
42
 K tématu osobností soudců ESD a jejich rozhodovací činnosti viz např. rozhovor se soudcem 
Schiemannem a generálním advokátem Poiares Maduro: (Schiemann, et al., 2004). 
43
 srovnej (Grimmel, 2011), str. 12 a násl. 
44
 srovnej čl. 19/2 SEU 
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soudních funkcí v jejich zemích.“
45
 Nelze tak vyloučit, že na národní úrovni budou ve 
výběru kandidátů hrát roli politické důvody: členský stát může do Lucemburku vyslat 
někoho, kdo si to "zaslouží“ z politických důvodů. V akademii se lze setkat s názory, že 
takové praktiky jsou v EU „veřejným tajemstvím.“
46
 
Lisabonská smlouva proto zavedla do procesu ustavování soudců ještě jednu instanci, a 
to výbor složený zejména ze soudců ústavních soudů členských států či z bývalých 
soudců ESD, kterého úkolem je vydat „stanovisko k vhodnosti kandidátů na funkce 
soudce a generálního advokáta.“
47
 Toto ustanovení vzniklo právě v reakci na kritiku 
možných politických nominací na úrovni členských států.
48
 Problémem tohoto výboru 
však je, že jeho stanoviska jsou neveřejná, což může ještě oslabit důvěru v legitimitu 
celého výběrového procesu.
49
 Navíc, tato další instance sice klade vyšší nároky na 
kandidáty nominované členskými státy, nevylučuje však sama politické nominace.
50
 
Míra politizace ESD (resp. SDEU) v otázkách nominace soudců zůstává v rovině 
spekulací. Jmenování soudců předchází dvě instance výběru, obě jsou však pro 
veřejnost netransparentní a nelze tak vyloučit jistou míru politizace celého procesu. 
Řešením by bylo transparentnější rozhodování, a to alespoň na úrovni Výboru podle 
článku 255. Kdyby stanoviska Výboru byla veřejná a odůvodněná, byla by potenciální 
politizace v mnoha ohledech limitována. 
IV. 3 Rozhodování ESD v klíčových otázkách:
51
 
Evropská unie je politický projekt. Od svého založení v padesátých letech ve formě 
Evropských společenství prošla dynamickým vývojem, ve kterém hrál ESD velmi 
významnou roli. Na rozdíl od Nejvyššího soudu USA sice neřešil otázky výsostně 
politické (ve smyslu Hirschlovy definice mega-politics), judikoval však v oblastech jako 
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 srovnej čl. 253 SFEU 
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 viz např. (Barents, 2010), str. 712 
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 srovnej čl. 255 SFEU 
48
 srovnej např. (Chalmers, et al., 2010), str. 144 či (Barents, 2010), str. 712 
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 viz např. komentáře (Bobek, 2010) či (EU Law Blog, 2010) 
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 evropského práva v národních právních řádech, 
odpovědnost státu za škodu pro nesplnění povinností plynoucích z evropského práva,
54
 
procesní postavení Evropského Parlamentu před ESD
55
 či otázky vnitřního trhu EU.
56
 
Jedná se určitě o otázky právně politické, ve smyslu Tomsovy definice dokonce super-
politické, vzhledem k tomu, že Tomsa definoval právní politiku jako vytváření pravidel 
na základě právních principů, ESD však v uvedených případech dokonce vytvořil 
právní principy na základě „ducha Smlouvy“ – jde tedy ještě o úroveň dál. 
Co se týče metody, ESD vytvořil tato klíčová rozhodnutí jednak prostřednictvím 
teleologické interpretace primárního práva, jednak prostřednictvím mechanismu 
předběžných otázek. Když ESD interpretuje primární právo, činí tak na základě textu, 
kontextu a smyslu jednotlivých ustanovení.
57
 Generální advokát Ruiz Jarabo-Colomer 
mluví metaforicky o výkladu rukama, hlavou a srdcem.
58
 ESD v judikátu Van Gend 
založil princip přímého účinku „s ohledem na duch, obecný záměr a text Smlouvy.“
59
 
Rozhodnutí založená na teleologickém výkladu, ať už se mu říká kontext, výklad srdcem 
či duch Smlouvy, je bezpochyby politickým rozhodnutím ve smyslu anglického policy 
choice. Jedná se o případy, kde soud určuje další směřování evropského projektu a mění 
jeho charakter v otázkách doposud neregulovaných. 
Zatímco někteří tuto kreativní interpretaci kritizují za nedostatečnou legitimitu, Andreas 
Grimmel ESD obhajuje. Hlavním jeho argumentem je, že ESD se do role aktivistického 
soudu staví v situacích, kdy je zákonodárce nečinný.
60
 I Craig a De Búrca argumentují, 
že aktivismus ESD nebyl v průběhu evropské integrace stejně intenzivní.
61
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Grimmelův argument sice neobstojí ve všech případech soudcovského aktivismu, lze jej 
však aplikovat na případ Cassis de Dijon.
62
 Cassis se odehrál v době, kdy byl zřejmý 
zájem Unie na vybudování vnitřního trhu, zákonodárce však k dosažení tohoto cíle 
neudělal žádné kroky. ESD proto zasáhl a vytvořením politiky vzájemného uznávání 
zboží mezi členskými státy
63
 nastartoval „nový přístup k harmonizaci“. Toto rozhodnutí 
bylo posléze politickými institucemi EU přijato a zapracováno do Jednotného 
evropského aktu (1985), kterým byly změněny Smlouvy. 
Uvedené (a mnohé další) případy ESD hrály v procesu evropské integrace významnou 
úlohu. Kdybychom je analyzovali ve světle definicí politiky uvedených ve druhé 
kapitole, všechny definice by je označily za (právně) politické. Jedná se také o 
judicializaci politiky ve smyslu uvedeném výše. V takové situaci, jak naznačuje Kühn, 
je extrémně důležité, aby v případě rozhodování politických otázek byli soudci 
nezávislí, důležité jsou tedy záruky uvedené v kapitolách 3.1 a 3.2. 
IV. 4 Vztah ESD k ostatním institucím EU 
Pavel Rychetský i Eliška Wagnerová shodně argumentují, že politický charakter 
Ústavního soudu ČR není něčím, za co by měl být Ústavní soud kárán. Naopak, 
vzhledem k tomu, že ústavní soudy jsou vybaveny pravomocí přezkoumávat předpisy 
přijaté zákonodárcem, vstupují do oblasti politiky a nemůžou nebýt politické.
64
 ESD 
také disponuje pravomocí přezkoumávat legislativní akty evropského zákonodárce a 




 je hezkou ilustrací politické moci ESD ve vztahu 
k legislativě. Evropský zákonodárce se v devadesátých letech rozhodl regulovat oblast 
reklamy tabákových výrobků v podobě směrnice, ESD však tuto směrnici na podnět 
Německa zrušil z důvodu nesprávného legislativního postupu. Zajímavé je, že ve svém 
rozsudku ESD zahrnul i radu, jakým způsobem by tato směrnice mohla být přijata 
znovu tak, aby v přezkumu ústavnosti obstála. Druhá směrnice, přijatá podle instrukcí 
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soudu, byla soudem potvrzená jako platně přijatá.
66
 Soud se tak aktivně zúčastnil 
procesu přijímání legislativy, což lze bezpochyby označit za politické. 
V jiné oblasti se ESD naopak odmítl postavit do role zákonodárce. Problematika 
volného pohybu obchodních společností po EU je regulována v primárním právu, avšak 
jen stručně.
67
 V osmdesátých letech se počítalo s přijetím mezinárodní smlouvy, která 
by tuto oblast upravila, tato smlouva však nakonec nebyla uzavřena.
68
 V politických 
orgánech Unie chyběl konsensus na základních otázkách mobility společností, Komise 
se proto nikdy neshodla na znění směrnice, která by stanovila bližší pravidla.
69
 Tato 
oblast proto byla regulována Soudem kazuisticky.
70
 Když v roce 2007 Komise ukončila 
legislativní proces s tím, že ESD by mohl právní úpravu v této oblasti vyjasnit v 
aktuálním případě Cartesio,
71
 Soud tuto delegaci odmítl a vyřešil jen konkrétní případ, 
na který se kauza vztahovala. Přidal sice jisté obiter dictum, které sahá za hranici 
samotného případu, nejudikoval však v oblasti práva společností tak obsáhle, jak tomu 
bylo v sedmdesátých a osmdesátých letech v oblastech účinků evropského práva či 
v oblasti vnitřního trhu. 
Třetím příkladem institucionálního dialogu v EU je kauza Jégo-Quéré,
72
 ve které 
Tribunál navrhoval změnu judikatury v oblasti procesně-právního postavení jednotlivců 
v žalobě pro neplatnost.
73
 ESD jako odvolací instance se změnou judikatury 
nesouhlasil,
74
 Tribunál však zrušení svého rozsudku nepovažoval za prohru. Návrh totiž 
sice neuspěl u ESD, avšak zjevně uspěl v kruzích, kde se připravovala Lisabonská 
smlouva. Nová úprava v primárním právu totiž částečně přijímá názor Tribunálu, který 
byl sice Soudem odmítnutý, našel však cestu do Smluv.
75
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Účelem nastínění těchto tří linií judikatury ESD je poukázat na to, že Soud může mít 
velice silné postavení ve vztahu k zákonodárci, buďto v kontextu přezkumu ústavnosti 
(Tobacco Advertising), z důvodu explicitní delegace zákonodárce (volný pohyb 
společností), nebo v situaci, kde rozhodnutí Soudu inspiruje legislativce ke změnám 
platné právní úpravy (Jégo-Quéré). Tato role Soudu má nesporně politickou konotaci, 
některými autory bývá tato dimenze dokonce označována za „nejzjevnější a 
nejpůsobivější typ soudcovské politiky.“
76
 
IV. 5 Vliv ESD na politiku v členských státech 
Poslední dimenzi politického charakteru ESD lze zkoumat ve vztahu judikatury ESD 
k politické situaci v členských státech. Právo a politika EU postupem času získávají 
v národním kontextu významnější postavení a evropský právní řád je dokonce schopen 
ovlivnit domácí rozložení moci.
77
 Opět je možné demonstrovat toto tvrzení na třech 
příkladech. 
Ve Spojeném království dlouhodobě probíhal boj rozličných organizací za rovnost žen a 
mužů, zejména v oblasti pracovního práva. Z důvodu domácího politického nastavení 
neměli aktivisté vyhlídky na úspěch, zvolili proto metodu evropské litigace. Karen Alter 
uvádí, že potenciální úspěch této metody závisí na čtyřech podmínkách: (1) existence 
oprávnění v evropském právu, (2) existence žalobce, který je ochoten absolvovat 
dlouhou a finančně náročnou litigaci na několika úrovních, (3) ochotu národních soudů 
aplikovat evropské právo anebo podat předběžnou otázku do Lucemburku, a (4) přijetí 
lucemburského rozhodnutí národními aktéry. Příklady z judikatury, které potvrzují, že 
evropská litigace může přinést změnu v interpretaci a aplikaci práva, nebo dokonce 





Dalším příkladem je oblast evropského občanství. Radikální rozhodnutí soudu ve 




 vedla členské státy ke změně jejich 
                                                          
 
76
 viz např. (Rehder, 2007), str. 6  
77
 (Alter, 2009), str. 159 
78
 ECJ, Case 43 /75 Defrenne v Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne Sabena [1978] ECR 1365 
79
 ECJ, Case C-152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
[1976] ECR 723 
80
 ECJ, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925 
81
 ECJ, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 2011, not yet reported 
 79   
legislativy upravující národní občanství. Irsko přijalo novelu zákona o občanství v roce 
2004, Belgie v posledních deseti letech měnila imigrační legislativu již dvakrát.
82
 Soud 
tak svojí rozhodovací činnosti dal národním zákonodárcům podnět ke změně zákonů, 
což lze bezpochyby označit za politický vliv. 
Třetí příklad se týká velice vzácného typu žaloby před ESD, a to žaloby jednoho 
členského státu proti druhému.
83
 Maďarsko podalo žalobu proti Slovensku na základě 
politického konfliktu, který se mezi oběma státy odehrál v srpnu 2009 v souvislosti 
s odhalením sochy sv. Štěpána v Komárně.
84
 ESD zatím ještě nevydal rozsudek ve věci, 
k dispozici je jen stanovisko generálního advokáta Bot, lze však předpokládat, že Soud 
bude následovat argumentaci nastíněnou generálním advokátem, která je založena na 
rozdělení kompetencí: spory mezi členskými státy jsou otázkou mezinárodního 
diplomatického práva, nelze je proto řešit ve světle ustanovení o evropském občanství. 
Jedině v případě, kdy by byly spory dlouhodobé a narušovaly by přátelské sousedské 
vztahy mezi členskými státy, dostal by se spor do působnosti ESD z titulu preambule 
Smluv, jakož i z titulu čl. 4/3 TEU, který zakládá povinnost loajality členských států. 
Na těchto třech příkladech lze vidět, že ESD je schopen být silným politickým hráčem 
ve vztahu k členským státům. Mechanismus předběžných otázek je důležitou součástí 
soudní soustavy EU, umožňuje totiž soukromým žalobcům domoct se svých nároků 
plynoucích z evropského práva, za předpokladu, že najdou podporu u národních soudů. 
Judikatura ESD může mít vliv na národní legislativu i nepřímo, jak bylo nastíněno 
v případech evropského občanství měnících zákony v Irsku a Belgii. Soud však odmítá 
vstupovat do politických konfliktů mezi členskými státy, není-li to nezbytně nutné.  
V. Závěr 
Otázku, zda je ESD politickým aktérem, není snadné zodpovědět. Alespoň ne předtím, 
než se pojem politického aktéra jasně vydefinuje a otázka tak získá jasnější obrysy. Tato 
práce měla za úkol podat syntézu rozličných definicí politiky a analyzovat soudní moc 
EU v jejich kontextu. 
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Jak Nejvyšší soud USA, tak i ESD již byly obviněny z toho, že jsou politické, bez 
ohledu na to, že jejich složení a fungování se do velké míry liší. Lze předpokládat, že 
Nejvyššímu soudu USA se politický charakter připisuje zejména z důvodu politického 
způsobu jmenování soudců a z důvodu, že jeho rozhodnutí se často pohybují v oblasti 
politických kontroverzí (Hirschlova mega-politika), jako například rasová segregace, 
oddělení církve od státu, svoboda projevu, cenzura, pornografie, právo na potrat, 
zdravotní pojištění a mnohé další. 
Evropský kontext je odlišný. Tato práce definovala pět možných rovin, ve kterých by 
soudy EU mohly být označeny za politické. Jak však bylo vysvětleno v kapitole 
věnované definicím politiky, definic je tolik, kolik je autorů o politice píšících. Z tohoto 
důvodu je vhodnější zkoumat, zda je ECJ (1) politicky motivovaný, tj. složený ze 
soudců, který rozhodují na základě politických preferencí, (2) politicky ovlivněný ve 
fázi jmenování soudců, (3) politicky kreativní ve své rozhodovací činnosti, (4) politicky 
vlivný vůči ostatním institucím EU a (5) politicky vlivný vůči politice členských států. 
Zatímco první dvě dimenze se v podstatě kryjí s pojmem politizace justice, třetí, čtvrtou 
a pátou dimenzi lze spojit s pojmem judicializace politiky. 
Na základě výše uvedených analýz lze říct, že ESD je jak politicky kreativní, tak i 
politicky vlivný. V minulosti rozhodl klíčové kauzy, proměnil Smlouvy v ústavu, 
vytvořil právní principy jen na základě ducha Smlouvy, vyplnil mezery v činnosti jiných 
politických orgánů a jeho judikatura měla a nepochybně stále má vliv jak na 
meziinstitucionální dialog v rámci Unie, tak i na politické diskuse v členských státech. 
ESD tedy definitivně naplňuje definice politického soudu podle autorů jako například 
Tocqueville, Tomsa či Easton.  
ESD je tak nesporně aktivistickým soudem ve smyslu judicializace politiky. Aktuální je 
tedy názor Zdenka Kühna, který upozorňuje, že soudcovský aktivismus je „nezbytnou 
součástí současné evropské justice, a současně vyvolává dodatečný apel na skutečnou 
nezávislost justice.“ Jako politický aktér tedy ESD nesmí být politikou příliš ovlivněn 
ve smyslu politizace justice. Nezávislý musí být jak výběr soudců, tak i jejich myšlení. 
ESD má jen málo limitů pro svoji rozhodovací činnost. Jedním z nejdůležitějších je 
však racionalita: praktický dopad judikatury ESD totiž vždy závisí na přijetí těchto 
pravidel dalšími aktéry. Již dlouhou dobu hrají důležitou roli ústavní soudy členských 
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států, zejména německý ústavní soud, který Soudu vymezuje určité hranice. Také 
spolupráce ostatních soudů členských států je nezbytnou podmínkou pro to, aby 
rozhodování ESD bylo efektivní a vynutitelné. 
Jak bylo naznačeno výše, význam žádné instituce nelze pochopit jen studiem jejího 
právního zakotvení. I role ESD může být pochopena jen díky náhledu do politologie či 
jiných společenských věd. V budoucnosti by bylo zajímavé zkoumat rozhodovací 
činnost ESD v kontextu současné ekonomické krize a měnící se atmosféry v různých 
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